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Apologies are part of daily life and occur in a variety of contexts. A large body of
literature on the effects of apologies indicated that apologies have a positive effect –
those receiving apologies have more positive views of the transgressor (e.g., Bornstein,
Rung, & Miller, 2002; Goei, Roberty, Meyer, & Carlyle, 1997; Robbennolt, 2003; Sitkin
& Beis, 1993; Takaku, 2000). An area of emerging research in the realm of apologies is
in the area of medical malpractice. The research presented here sought to expand on the
field of apologies, specifically by examining the effects of an apology in a medical
malpractice case. After reading the facts of a medical malpractice case, participants
watched a videotaped statement of the defendant, which contained either an apology or
an excuse. Other manipulated variables included the familiarity between the plaintiff and
defendant, how steadily the defendant maintained eye contact during his statement, and
how quickly the defendant spoke while making his statement. Analyses revealed
marginal main effects for statement type, eye contact and speech rate on ratings of
sincerity. Main effects emerged for perceptions of the defendant – participants viewed
him more favorably when he apologized. Implications and areas of future research are
then discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
In July 2009 police in Cambridge, Massachusetts arrested Harvard professor
Henry Louis Gates after a concerned neighbor called in a report about men attempting to
break into a house. Arriving at the home, the police approached Gates and his driver and
asked for identification, to which he replied, “Why, because I’m a black man in
America?” Police arrested Gates for disorderly conduct, after which he spent four hours
in jail. Even though the city dropped the charges, Gates remains unsatisfied. What he
desires, he has said, is an apology from the arresting officer. “I believe the police officer
should apologize to me for what he knows he did that was wrong. If he apologizes
sincerely, I am willing to forgive him. If he admits his error, I am willing to educate him
about the history of racism in America and the issue of racial profiling” (Jan, 2009). The
officer refused to apologize.
Professor Gates’ response to his arrest and treatment by the police highlights a
basic human response to an adverse event: the desire for an apology. In this case,
Professor Gates sought an apology for the humiliation of being arrested and, according to
some, profiled. Given that it is such a basic component of human interaction, it is
important to clearly define apology and establish what sets it apart from other forms of
communication.
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the factors that make an apology
more/less credible and effective, particularly in a legal context. I will begin with a
discussion of how conflict arises and how transgressors respond to such conflict. After
defining apology and distinguishing it from other forms of accounts, I will discuss why
offering an account is an important step for the transgressor. Next I will explore what
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effects accounts, specifically apologies, have on the transgressor and victim, as well as
some variables which can affect the impact of accounts and apologies. Then I will
discuss skepticism about apologies and the ability to detect whether one is offering a
genuine apology or not. Finally, I present an experiment that tests the effectiveness of
different kinds of apology in a legal context.
CHAPTER 2: Conflicts and Accounts
Conflict
In Goffman’s (1955) seminal work, he proposed a typology for how a
transgressor should act when faced with his wrongdoing. According to Goffman, conflict
arises when one makes a challenge to another, which can result in a conflict. In terms of
transgressions, the wrongdoer has challenged his victim by creating an imbalance in the
relationship; the transgression has put one of the parties at a disadvantage. Because this
imbalance creates discomfort within the relationship (see discussion below), the
transgressor will often make what Goffman termed an “offering” to the victim. The
offering’s purpose is to help restore a balance to the relationship. The offering may be
tangible (e.g., I will offer you the price of the car I ruined) or intangible (e.g., I will
volunteer at your shelter for some period of time). After the transgressor has made the
offering, it is up to the victim to accept or reject his offer. Finally, if the victim accepts
the offer, the transgressor replies with gratitude. One of the most important elements of
Goffman’s typology is the offering. The type of offering made can have serious
implications for its acceptance or rejection and, in turn, can have serious implications for
both the transgressor and the victim.
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Accounts
One response to a challenge is for the transgressor to offer an account for the
event. According to Schlenker and Darby (1981, p. 271), “accounts are attempts to
explain away the undesirable event through excuses and justifications.” In terms of
accounts, Schönbach (1990, p. 11-12) suggests a four-phase interaction between an actor
and an opponent. According to Schönbach, the first phase involves a failure event,
wherein the victim holds the transgressor responsible, to some extent, for a normviolating action. (For a discussion of norms, see discussion below.) The failure event
can, according to Schönbach, be either an act of omission or an act of commission. After
the failure event, the second phase is the reproach phase in which the victim reacts to the
failure event. Here the victim responds in a way he deems appropriate; responses can
range from slight aggravation to a search for why the event occurred to even sympathy or
compassion for the transgressor. Next comes the account phase, in which the
transgressor responds to the victim’s reproach, eventually offering an account, admission
of guilt, or denial. Finally, in the evaluation phase, the victim evaluates the situation,
considering the account offered, the account’s appropriateness as it relates to the failure
event, and the transgressor’s personality as it relates to both the account and the failure
event. Accounts, then, are tactics whereby a transgressor acknowledges some wrong, but
fails to take full responsibility for his part in the infraction. (One exception to this is
denial, which is included as an account but is clearly distinguished from excuse and
justification. Another exception, within the scope of this paper, is apology. See the
section below for a more thorough explanation.)
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As Sugimoto (1997, p. 361) has suggested, when making an account a
transgressor is “more likely to explicitly state that [he] had no control over the situation
and attribute the offense to forgetfulness.” The purpose of accounts is to resolve the
conflict associated with the actor’s behavior, which has harmed another (Itoi, Ohbuchi, &
Fukuno, 1996) and, based on the type of account given, the account can help the victim
understand the harm-doer’s state of mind (Miller, 2001; Wagatsuma & Rosett, 1986).
Researchers refer to excuse, justification, and denial as the most common types of
accounts. (Some researchers, e.g., Itoi et al., 1996, include apology as a type of account,
while other researchers distinguish it from an account, e.g., Scher & Darley, 1997.)
Because apologies indicate acceptance of responsibility for an action (see discussion
below), it is perhaps best to identify them as a distinct subset of accounts. Although
apologies share properties with excuses and justifications (e.g., acknowledgement of a
transgression), they also include acceptance of responsibility, something lacking in
justifications and excuses. Therefore, using the umbrella term “accounts” does little to
inform a reader about the transgressor’s acceptance of responsibility. However, as
mentioned, some researchers include apology as a form of account. Itoi et al. (1996, p.
914) offered three factors that can help distinguish accounts: the causal association
between the transgressor’s actions and the harmful event; outcome harmfulness; and
personal responsibility. These are elaborated in the different kinds of accounts, discussed
next.
Excuses
An excuse, one might say, is a partial apology, an apology that does not accept
total responsibility for the transgression. “Excuses are explanations for actions that
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lessen the negative implications of an actor’s performance, thereby maintaining a positive
image for oneself and others” (Snyder, Higgins, & Stucky, 1983, p. 4). For example, a
transgressor who makes an excuse would admit the link between her action and the
outcome, but would minimize her role in the outcome, blaming the outcome on a cause
beyond her control (Fukuno & Ohbuchi, 1998; Itoi et al., 1996; Schönbach, 1990).
Researchers often view excuses as being the most closely related account to an apology.
In essence, the transgressor is saying, “Yes, I did this act and this act caused X outcome,
but circumstances beyond my control made me act in this way.” People offering excuses
note dual motivations for their account-making: they wish to avoid punishment, but they
also wish to alleviate anger (Itoi et al., 1996).
Justifications
As with an excuse, with a justification “the harm-doer recognizes personal
association, but either attempts to minimize the perceived harmfulness of the event or
rejects responsibility by attempting to justify his or her act” (Fukuno & Ohbuchi, 1998, p.
167; Itoi et al., 1996; Schönbach, 1990). Here, a transgressor admits her action but
claims that her reason for behaving in such a way has a valid/just foundation.
Justifications are more removed from apologies because, although a transgressor might
admit association with some wrongdoing and accepts responsibility for the action and its
outcomes, she does not accept blame for the action or its outcomes because she believes
her actions are justified. The main motive for people to use justifications is avoiding
punishment (Itoi et al., 1996). Therefore, unlike excuses, justifications become more
self-focused. Perhaps the most clear conceptualization of the distinction of excuses and
justifications comes from Semin and Manstead (1983, p. 80): “Excuses deny some or
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any measure of responsibility for what is admittedly an offensive act. Justifications deny
some or any measure of offensiveness in an act for which the individual admits
responsibility.”
Denials
Finally, denial involves the transgressor rejecting all association with the harmful
event (Fukuno & Ohbuchi, 1998; Itoi et al., 1996; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004).
A denial is issued when the transgressor admits no association with the event and accepts
no responsibility for the event or its outcomes. Although denial might have negative
consequences (Itoi and colleagues, 1996, for example, noted that a denial indicates no
intention of actually resolving a social conflict, as the actor refuses to acknowledge a
violation or any responsibility for harmful consequences), Kim and colleagues (2004)
suggested that denial can be a beneficial account strategy in some circumstances.
Specifically, Kim et al. argued that when there has been a trust violation, denial might be
in the violator’s best interest, as it could force individuals to give him the benefit of the
doubt. Also, in terms of certain types of relational violations, denial actually acts as the
optimal response -- for example, when one had committed an “integrity-based violation”
(e.g., intentionally misfiling paperwork to “understate a client’s taxable income,” Ferrin,
Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007, p. 897, Experiment 1). According to the authors, denial is
an optimal response when a violation is integrity-based because perceivers initially
believe allegations of violations. A denial, however, can lead the perceiver to “unaccept”
his belief in the denier’s guilt. Also, the desire to avoid punishment is a primary force
behind denial (Itoi et al., 1996), as it is similarly a major motivation for justification.
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Confessions
I will offer one further type of account: confession. According to Weiner,
Graham, Peter, and Zmuidinas (1991), a confession “assumes both the acceptance of
responsibility and personal blame” (p. 283). In this instance, confession is distinct from
the other accounts because it involves one accepting blame and taking responsibility, but,
following Weiner and colleagues’ definition, it does not include any attempt at explaining
one’s behavior. Instead, one simply admits fault, but does not necessarily have to explain
her motivation for behaving in a particular way. This lack of explanation is what
distinguishes confessions from apologies.
Apologies
Set apart from accounts (or at least a special type of account), but falling in line
with Goffman’s (1955) suggestion of an offering, are apologies. Apologies have been
defined and conceptualized in many ways, but all have common components. One of the
most cited definitions for apology comes from Schlenker and Darby (1981), who defined
apologies as “admissions of blameworthiness and regret by the actor” (p. 271). Like
excuses and justifications, apologies establish a link between a transgressor’s action and
its consequences. However, unlike excuses and justifications, when one makes an
apology, one assumes full responsibility for the action and its consequences (Fukuno &
Ohbuchi, 1998; Itoi et al., 1996; Kim et al., 2004; Petrucci, 2002), intended or unintended
(Cohen, 1999).
Lazare (2006) offered a look at the structure of an apology. He identified four
parts of an apology and noted that, although all parts are not required for an effective
apology, if an apology is deemed ineffective, the failure can likely be traced back to a
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defect in one or more of the parts (see also Regehr & Gutheil, 2002; Scher & Darley,
1997). Lazare posited that the first step in any apology is acknowledgment; one cannot
apologize (or give any account, for that matter), without first recognizing that some
violation has occurred. Like excuses and justifications, the next step in apology comes
when the transgressor attempts to explain his behavior. This explanation is similar to
what one might offer in an excuse or justification, but will include acceptance of
responsibility, something not included in an explanation that accompanies an excuse or
justification. Lazare further pointed out that explanations might serve to aggravate or
mitigate the circumstances of the situation. Further, he suggested, explanations are not
always appropriate or warranted, such as when one says, “There is no explanation I can
offer for what happened.” The explanation offered with an apology essentially serves the
same purpose as an explanation does when it is part of an excuse (“This is why X
occurred”), but the acceptance of responsibility in an apology sets the explanation apart
from the explanation in an excuse. As I will discuss below, this explanation (or perhaps
its lack) can play a large role in a victim’s reaction, and might, as Lazare suggested,
change the dynamics of the situation, making it better or, in some cases, worse. After the
offender has offered his explanation, he will express “remorse, shame, forbearance, and
humility” (p. 1401). Each of these expressions will convey to the victim that the
transgressor recognizes his violation and registers the appropriate emotional response to
causing the victim harm. Finally, the transgressor will offer some type of reparation,
although the transgressor might not explicitly state what she will pay (Wagatsuma &
Rosett, 1986).
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Lazare’s (2006) four-part typology is in line with other research. Specifically,
Anderson and Prkachin (1998 as cited in Anderson, Linden, & Habra, 2006, p. 348)
identified six verbal components of apologies: explicit expression of remorse, specific
statement of why one feels remorse, acceptance of responsibility, truthful explanation for
offensive behavior without trying to excuse the offense and shirk responsibility, promise
of forbearance, and an offer of restitution. (See also Wagatsuma & Rosett, 1986, for a
similar outline.)
Unlike the other accounts listed above, the desire to alleviate anger is what drives
apology (Itoi et al., 1996; McPherson Frantz & Bennigson, 2005). Thus, while excuse,
justification, and denial all involve the desire to avoid punishment, a self-focused desire,
apologies, in their pure form, appear to be focused solely on the relationship with the
other (other-focused), addressing the victim’s “face-needs” (i.e., need to restore one’s
previous image of oneself; Harris, Grainger, & Mullany, 2006). While apologies may
serve other functions (e.g., reducing anger and retaliation, see Ohbuchi, Kameda, &
Agarie, 1989), they help the victim’s “face” by acknowledging the victim’s less-thanideal situation and accepting responsibility. In essence, when one apologizes, she is
saying, “I realize my action has put you in this situation and out of respect I accept
responsibility for my action and its effect on you.” This contrasts with excuses or
justifications, in which the actor might recognize the victim’s situation, but does not
signal respect by accepting responsibility for her actions.
Knowing the different kinds of accounts people employ, one question researchers
have investigated is why offenders feel the need to offer accounts. The next section will
address this issue.
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CHAPTER 3: After the Transgression: Why Offenders Offer Accounts
In what cases do people offer accounts? What warrants an account and what are
the ramifications of transgressions and accounts? Because of fundamental shifts in
relationships when one party has wronged the other, accounts become essential in
restoring the relationship to its pre-transgression state (Kelley, 1998). Exline, Deshea,
and Holeman (2007) reported that wrongdoers who do not apologize often do not receive
the benefits of establishing (or re-establishing) personal relationships. In the following
section I will attempt to explain why accounts are essential to rebuilding relationships for
both the transgressor and victim.
Cognitive Dissonance
One well-known phenomenon in social psychology is that of cognitive
dissonance. Put simply, cognitive dissonance occurs when one’s actions and beliefs do
not match (Festinger, 1957). In one of the first studies of cognitive dissonance, Festinger
and Carlsmith (1959) had participants engage in a boring task of placing spools on a tray,
removing them, and placing them back on the tray. After spooling and re-spooling for 30
minutes, participants turned pegs on a board for an additional 30 minutes. Participants
then agreed to speak with an incoming participant in exchange for either $1 or $20. Most
participants told the incoming participant the task had been interesting and enjoyable.
After the second participant went to participate in the task, researchers asked the first
participants about their reaction to the task (e.g., how enjoyable it was). The results
indicated that participants who received $1 rated the task as more enjoyable than did
those who received $20. The researchers explained these findings by suggesting that
participants who received only $1 had inadequate justification for their behavior (i.e.,
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lying to the second participant) and therefore changed their attitudes to match their
behavior (changing from thinking the task was boring to thinking it was enjoyable to
justify telling the second participant the task was enjoyable). Participants who received
$20, on the other hand, felt justified lying to the second participant because the payoff
was enough to legitimize their behavior.
This study (as well as other cognitive dissonance research) might provide an
explanation for why people offer apologies. People generally have positive views of
themselves (Alicke, 1985), so when they engage in behavior which is not consistent with
that view (e.g., committing some transgression), they might offer an apology to reconcile
the discrepancy. For example, if Grace thinks she is a good person but offends Anne, she
might offer Anne an apology to help restore her image of herself.
Norms
In terms of the relationship between the victim and the offender, social norms
dictate that when one has wronged another in some way, he shall first acknowledge some
wrong has occurred (i.e., one has violated expectations for his behavior), and then he
shall make reparations for the act and its consequences. Goffman (1955, p. 95) suggested
that “a social norm is that kind of guide for action which is supported by social
sanctions...The significance of these rewards and penalties is not meant to lie in their
intrinsic, substantive worth but in what they proclaim about the moral status of the actor.”
As Semin and Manstead (1983) put it, “the pervasive aspect of the accountability of
social conduct as a general feature of social existence is that it is an essential and
undismissable desideratum for orderly social interaction at any level” (p. 173, italics in
original). Tavuchis (1991) echoed these sentiments, noting that social order depends on
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its members’ commitment to social norms. These norms, he argues, are essential to
society running smoothly and are often unnoticed until something occurs which draws
attention to them. Apologies, then, which occur after a norm-disrupting behavior, serve
as indicators of the actor’s “moral orientation” and also “register tensions and
displacements in personal and public belief systems” (p. 13). The pervasiveness and
inherent nature of these norms are apparent even in young children, who learn and
demonstrate the knowledge that when one has transgressed, one must, in some way, offer
a reparation for her action (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1982, 1989; Ebert, 2008; Ohbuchi &
Sato, 1994).
Apologies, according to Scher and Darley (1997), relay that the actor is aware of
the social requirement to apologize. As Leary, Springer, Negel, Ansell, and Evans (1998)
remarked, the general expectation is that people will treat others in a positive way. When
negative treatment occurs, then, people react to it as an unexpected event and, in turn, it
becomes more salient to them. Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh (2005) agreed, commenting
that “most individuals expect that moral norms should prevail and that they are entitled to
fair procedures and treatment...” (p. 638). Bowing to this social pressure can be
problematic, however. Exline and colleagues (2007) noted, for instance, that oftentimes
offenders will offer apologies due to external pressure, but they will not internalize the
apology, refusing to accept blame for the situation. Due to social pressure and norms, a
victim may feel that she has to accept an apology from a transgressor, even if she does
not really wish to, because norms dictate that once an apology has been offered, the
victim should accept (McPherson-Frantz & Bennigson, 2005) and perhaps even has a
responsibility to do so (Bennett & Dewberry, 1994; Stubbs, 2007). When an offender

13
makes a very public display of his apology, the burden falls to the victim to respond, and,
in an effort to save face or not appear unforgiving, the victim might, however grudgingly,
accept the proffered apology. Indeed, Risen and Gilovich (2007) noted that participants
not only wanted to accept apologies more than reject them, they also felt that they should
accept the apologies (see also Kelley, 1998). Even when faced with an insincere
apology, participants reported that they were more likely to accept it than reject it, even
though their desire was to reject the insincere apology. As the authors wrote,
“participants’ predictions of how likely they would be to accept or reject a given apology
followed not their desires but their sense of obligation” (p. 426).
Balance Theory
In maintaining relationships, balance plays a key role. Heider (1958) offered a
discussion of the importance of balance in maintaining relationships. A balanced state
occurs when “the relations among the entities fit together harmoniously; there is no stress
towards change” (Heider, 1958, p. 201). Heider conceptualized balanced relationships in
terms of a triad. In relationships there are two entities (p and o, respectively) and some
mutual object (x). Balance occurs when evaluations are consistent among the three
entities. For example, if George (p) likes Martha (o), a positive relationship exists
between them. Further, assume Martha (o) likes vineyards (x). This, too, is a positive
relationship. Finally, one must ask if George (p) likes vineyards (x). If he does, the
relationship is balanced: George likes Martha, Martha likes vineyards, George likes
vineyards; all of the relationships are positive. Similarly, balance exists when there are
two negative relationships and one positive relationship. For example, if George (p)
dislikes Martha (o), and Martha (o) dislikes vineyards (x), but George (p) likes vineyards
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(x), a balanced relationship still exists. In this situation, George’s like of vineyards does
not conflict with his dislike of Martha or her dislike of vineyards: If Martha does not like
vineyards and George does not like Martha, he should feel no discomfort/imbalance for
liking vineyards. If, however, George does not like vineyards, an imbalanced
relationship results; if he likes Martha, it follows that he should like what she does. (This
holds true for things about which people hold strong attitudes; if Martha really, really
likes vineyards but George really, really dislikes them the imbalance will be greater than
if Martha only marginally likes vineyards and George only marginally dislikes them.) To
achieve balance, George must either reconsider his attitude toward Martha or his attitude
toward vineyards. As Robbennolt (2008) more recently observed, “wrongdoing results in
a moral imbalance in the relationship,” which prompts the parties involved to seek some
resolution to the conflict.
Indeed, after an injured party accepts the apology from the transgressor, balance
returns to the relationship and it can develop in an unimpeded manner (Petrucci, 2002).
Cohen (1999) suggested that, “having been harmed, the injured party may view the
offender as an adversary, and expect that what will be one side’s gain will be the other
side’s loss” (p. 4). After an infraction has occurred, an imbalance exists within the
relationship: the transgressor has placed the victim in some devalued position. An
apology acts as a weight, in a certain respect. When the offender offers it to his victim,
he is indicating that this commodity will remove the victim from his devalued position
(Cohen, 1999; Leape, 2005).
The mere offering of an account does not restore the relationship, however. Once
a victim has received the offer of an account, it is up to him to decide whether or not to
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accept it. If the victim accepts the apology, the two parties return to an equal footing. If
the victim does not accept the account, however, the imbalance remains in the
relationship. (The likelihood of a victim rejecting an apology is relatively small. Even in
situations in which normal social consequences of rejecting an apology are absent,
participants overwhelmingly accepted an offender’s apology, even in the face of
considerable provocation (Bennett & Earwaker, 1994; see also Bornstein, Rung, &
Miller, 2002). In this instance, however, the transgressor becomes the person in the
devalued position. (For a discussion of the implications of victims rejecting an account,
see the discussion below.) In view of this loss-gain perspective, one can see how the
dynamics of a relationship might shift after a transgression. An effective account,
however, can restore the relationship to balance.
Attribution
Another reason for the presence of accounts after a transgression involves
attribution. As a victim, one is likely to ask why some harmful event occurred and will
seek to answer this question. As Petrucci (2002) commented, people have a basic need to
understand their social world. Crime victims often wonder, “Why did this happen to
me?” Attributions help make sense of the social world and, as people can better
understand what is happening, the better they can control and predict events in their
world. Although a transgressor might not offer an explanation for why she chose a
particular victim, her account (with the exception of denial) can address the “Why?” if
not the “Why me?” Attribution research, therefore, provides helpful insight into how
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people perceive events and their causes. Research shows, however, that people are
susceptible to making errors in attribution.1
Fundamental Attribution Error
One of the most established principles in attribution research is the presence of
the fundamental attribution error (FAE; Ross, 1977). According to the FAE, when
attempting to explain another person’s behavior, one focuses primarily on the other’s
disposition, rather than considering situational factors. As Heider (1958) suggested,
“anything that is caused by p is ascribed to him” (p. 112); p was a necessary condition for
some event to have occurred. By attributing another’s behavior to something stable (i.e.,
personality), people can account for another’s behavior across a variety of situations, thus
providing them with some understanding and control. For example, if I believe John to
be dishonest because I witnessed him engage in questionable behavior one time, I should
be able to believe he will be dishonest in any situation. This belief will save me time and
mental energy when I encounter John in another situation, as I can say, “I know he is
dishonest, therefore I do not need to try and figure out why he is behaving in a particular
way in this (other) situation.”
Baumeister, Stillwell, and Wotman (1990) provided evidence that victims of
transgressions reported attributing perpetrators’ actions to personality-type causes (e.g.,
they saw the perpetrators’ actions as inconsistent, immoral, deliberately cruel). Victims
further reported that they believed the perpetrators’ actions were senseless. Successful
apologies, with their promise of avoiding such behavior in the future, might serve to
alleviate these character-damning attributions, then, as the wrongdoer’s apology might
1

The field of attribution research is vast and this discussion is by no means exhaustive. For
brevity, I will focus on two of the most common attribution errors: the fundamental attribution
error and the actor-observer effect.
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indicate that she will effect change in such a way (e.g., take care to be more careful in
similar future interactions) as to avoid future wrongs.
Actor-Observer Effect
Another, related attribution bias frequently discussed is the actor-observer effect
(Jones & Nisbett, 1972). According to this effect, people make different attributions
depending on whether they are the actor or observer in a situation. When one is an actor,
one makes attributions about her own behavior based on the situation, but when
observing others’ behavior makes attributions based on personality. Interestingly, by
simply having people change physical perspectives, researchers have been able to
ameliorate this effect (Storms, 1973). That is, by having actors take the physical
perspective of another person, researchers have shown that participants will then make
more situational attributions of the other person and more dispositional attributions about
themselves. Takaku, Weiner, and Ohbuchi (2001; Takaku, 2001) provided support for
this in the realm of wrongdoing, reporting that when participants imagined situations in
which they recalled themselves as wrongdoers, they “perceived the cause of the wrong
[committed by another person] to be significantly less controllable” (p. 161). Takaku et
al. explained these results in terms of participants’ views of themselves. According to the
authors, when people think of themselves as wrongdoers, they feel a certain sense of
hypocrisy in negatively judging others for their infractions. Hypocrisy also made
participants more concerned with the justice and fairness of the situation. As this sense
of hypocrisy increases, people tend to believe the cause of the infraction is more
uncontrollable and thus have less negative emotional reactions to the wrong. Ultimately,
this leads to greater forgiveness on the part of the participant.
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Research in the realm of transgressions and forgiveness supports these differing
attributions. Baumeister and colleagues (1990), for example, had participants recall
events in which they were the victim of some wrong and also recall incidents in which
they perpetrated some wrong. Analyses revealed that one’s role in a transgression affects
how one constructs an event, and discrepancies arise in terms of victims’ and
perpetrators’ explanations. When recalling themselves as perpetrators, participants
construed the event as something brief. They also tended to believe the harmful event
was an “uncharacteristic episode” (p. 1000) and bore little on present circumstances. In
another study (Leary et al., 1998). when asked about their responsibility in a harmful
event, both victims and perpetrators placed greater responsibility on the other party than
they took for themselves. Perpetrators also focused more on their lack of culpability for
an incident by claiming it was an accident (i.e., they attributed blame to the situation) or
that the victim played a part in the incident and therefore deserved the negative outcome.
Hodgins and Liebeskind (2003) found a similar pattern, noting that in
relationships among friends, perpetrators did little to offer mitigating evidence, but still
expected positive outcomes and enhanced future relationships with their friends. One
potential explanation for this is that perpetrators do not understand how much victims
dislike them and their actions, thereby underestimating a victim’s anger about the event
(Leary et al., 1998). Indeed, Baumeister and his associates (1990) remarked that victims
sometimes do not make their true feelings known, which can lead harmdoers to believe
their actions were not as harmful.
On the other hand, when recalling themselves as victims, participants reported
seeing the event as something ongoing, with the negative repercussions continuing after

19
the event has occurred (Baumeister et al., 1990). Baumeister and his colleagues further
noted that, in retrospect, perpetrators could provide explanations for their misdeeds, while
victims reported having difficulty making sense of the harmful episode, even after
considerable time had passed between the incident and recall. Interestingly, the
participants in this study recalled themselves as victims and perpetrators, but did not
appear to be aware of the discrepancies in their reports of harmful events. These
inconsistencies in recall might help explain how conflict and anger can arise.
Barclay et al. (2005) noted, for example, that the attribution one makes will affect
the association one makes between the harmful event and one’s emotional reaction to the
event. In other words, as the injustice of the event increases, so too should the person’s
negative emotional reaction to the event. Barclay and his colleagues went on to note that
the more a victim perceives an event as unjust, the more outward-focused his emotions
will be; outward-focused emotions include things such as anger and hostility. Factors
increasing such emotional reactions include how blameworthy the victim perceives the
transgressor to be for what has transpired and how avoidable the victim believes the
incident to have been. Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock (1998) reported similar findings,
such that participants primed to feel anger were more punitive than their control
counterparts. Dyck and Rule (1978) also found that men were more likely to retaliate
against a harmdoer when they perceived that the harmdoer was aware of the negative
outcomes his actions would cause.
Another situational factor exerting influence over the type of account offered is
the presence of mitigating circumstances (Ohbuchi, Suzuki, & Takaku, 2003). The more
mitigating circumstances present, the less responsible the offender felt and therefore the
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less responsibility he would take for the offense. When an offender considered
mitigating circumstances to be present, she felt less responsible and also expected the
victim to view her as less responsible. However, because victims rarely consider the
situational circumstances contributing to a transgressor’s behavior, this seems an unlikely
outcome for the transgressor. As McLaughlin, Cody, and O’Hair (1983) found,
perpetrators preferred excuse as their social account for transgressions, which the authors
took to “reflect the fact that most people in judging their own behavior attribute failure to
the circumstances of the situation rather than to their own bad intentions” (p. 222).
Transgressors may offer apologies, however, when there are few mitigating
circumstances present (e.g, Jaime bumped into Brian in an empty hallway versus a
crowded one) or when they are willing to accept responsibility for a situation. For
example, Khara might take responsibility for running into Jeff’s car, even though the
streets were icy. It is not so much that an apologizer does not consider situational forces
on his actions, but rather he accepts responsibility for the consequences, one element
which is missing from both excuses and justifications.
Legally speaking, foreseeability can have implications for one’s culpability. One
commits an intentional tort, for example, if she causes harm deliberately and
purposefully. Further, one might commit an intentional tort if she is substantially certain
that her act will have intended harmful consequences. One is negligent if she is aware of
a foreseeable risk (one a reasonable person would recognize) but acts anyway. In this
sense, when one is very certain her actions will produce a particular outcome, she may
face more severe consequences for her actions. As stated in the Restatement of Torts
(Second Edition, 2000, p. 45), “Normally the actor has much less reason to anticipate
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intentional misconduct than he has to anticipate negligence. In the ordinary case he may
reasonably proceed upon the assumption that others will not interfere in a manner
intended to cause harm to anyone.” This coincides with the concept of norms, in that a
person who knowingly violates a norm and knows her violation will likely result in some
negative consequence might face harsher judgments (both legally and socially) from
others than one who acts without knowledge of these standards.
Self-Protection
Attributions, then, can have serious implications for the victim and transgressor.
The effects of a transgression on the harmdoer herself, regardless of the effects on the
victim, also provide an impetus for offering an apology. Specifically, one’s view of
oneself can be threatened after one has committed some wrong. Overall, people have
positive views of themselves (Alicke, 1985). When one acts inconsistently, her selfconcept (“face”) is threatened. For example, if Jane believes herself to be a kind person,
but says something cruel to Olivia, her self-concept is threatened, as she acted in a
manner inconsistent with her positive view of herself.
Cognitive dissonance is one way to explain why people offer apologies in terms
of self-protection. As described above, cognitive dissonance can occur when one’s
actions and attitudes are inconsistent. If one behaves in a way that is inconsistent with
one’s self-view, an apology can help restore the original positive self-view. The severity
of the transgression, then, can affect what type of account one offers. For example,
bumping into someone in a crowded hallway might only warrant a hasty, “I’m sorry”
because the transgression is relatively minor (and somewhat unavoidable) and does not
threaten one’s positive self-view. Forgetting to mail someone’s bills, on the other hand,
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can have relatively serious consequences (e.g., resulting in more serious consequences)
and therefore more threatening to one’s self-image, resulting in a more thorough apology.
Goffman (1955) provided a definitive overview of people’s fundamental need to
“save face.” This need arises when we have acted in a way which threatens our selfconcept (i.e., our “face”). According to Goffman, people possess certain “faces” which
are in essence their identities. Faces come about from a combination of factors, including
a person’s internally consistent image of himself, feedback from others that is consistent
with one’s image, and feedback from “impersonal agencies in the situation.” As a person
becomes more aware of himself, he becomes attached to the image he has created and
others form expectations about his image as well. When something occurs to threaten
that face, he is in wrong face, which can lead to negative feelings. Further, when he is in
wrong face, he is likely to experience negative emotional reactions such as shame and
guilt due to his action and its effects on others’ perceptions of him and his own
perception of himself. Consistent with the idea of norms, Goffman suggested that “as an
aspect of the social code of any social circle, one may expect to find an understanding as
to how far a person should go to save his face” (p. 215). Goffman also noted the
importance of saving others’ faces as well. According to Goffman, “just as the member
of any group is expected to have self-respect, so also he is expected to sustain a standard
of considerateness; he is expected to go to certain lengths to save the feelings and the face
of others present…” (p. 215).
Because one’s face is partly socially constructed, the threats to one’s self-image
can be both internal and external. Barnlund and Yoshioka (1990; see also Finkelstein,
Wu, Holtzman, & Smith, 1997) pointed out that admissions of failure are particularly
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distressing and can negatively impact one’s self-esteem. For example, physicians are
often reluctant to admit their mistakes because of their desire to protect their reputations
(Leape, 2005) or maintain the image others have of them as “strong, always in charge,
unemotional, and a perfectionist” (Lazare, 2006, p. 1403). Leary and colleagues (1998)
agreed, asserting that “perpetrators in particular may be motivated to disclaim
responsibility, given that another person was hurt by their actions” (p. 1235). They went
on to suggest that perpetrators attempt to minimize “the degree to which they rejected and
disliked the person they hurt” (p. 1235), possibly to maintain their positive self-concept.
While offenders might be reluctant to apologize in order to save face, some are
motivated to apologize by a desire to obtain forgiveness from the injured party. Kelley
(1998), for example, found that victims were more likely to forgive transgressors when
the transgressor apologized. He further reported that desires to restore one’s sense of
well-being and balance to the relationship were important motivations to forgive
transgressors.
It seems unlikely that these two motivations (i.e., saving face, obtaining
forgiveness) will co-exist in the same situation. Forgiveness (sometimes) follows an
apology (e.g., McCullough et al., 1997; but see Philpot & Hornsey, 2008, who found that
an apology failed to promote forgiveness of an outgroup when that group offered an
apology for offending behavior), which necessarily involves accepting responsibility.
Disclaiming responsibility in order to save face, however, is distinctly not an apology. It
is unlikely therefore, that one disclaiming responsibility would attain forgiveness from
his victim. Although the transgressor might be motivated to receive forgiveness, if his
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need to save face outweighs his need for forgiveness, it appears unlikely that he will be
able to reach both goals.
The causes of an adverse event have implications for how protective one becomes
of one’s self-image as well. Ohbuchi et al. (2003) remarked that offenders reported
preferring apologies, but situational variables affected which account they would offer to
a victim. In cases of medical errors (e.g., Gallagher, Waterman, Ebers, Fraser, &
Levinson, 2003) or in legal settings (e.g., Wagatsuma & Rosett, 1986), for example,
transgressors report the desire to apologize but often do not for fear that the apology will
be taken as an admission of guilt. One such variable was the victim’s expectation about
what he deserved: The more a victim demanded from the offender, the more likely it was
that the offender would produce a responsibility-rejecting account (Ohbuchi et al., 2003).
The victim’s demand for compensation made the offender defensive and thus less likely
to accept responsibility for the event and its outcomes. This defensiveness, in turn,
indicates to the victim that the transgressor is not committed to repairing the relationship,
leading to greater dissatisfaction for the victim (Ashforth & Lee, 1990).
Self-Presentation
Transgressors, then, will frequently offer some type of account due to norms, to
restore a relationship to its previous state and/or to save face. Even if one does not feel a
particular action requires some form of an account, one might still offer an account in
order to present a positive image to others. Self-presentation involves an attempt to have
others perceive oneself in a particular way (Jones & Pittman, 1982). Strategic selfpresentation is particularly relevant to the issues of apology and account making.
According to Jones and Pittman, people engage in strategic self-presentation when they
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believe another’s view of them is particularly important. In this case they make a
conscious effort to convey a particular self to another person. In fact, one of the motives
associated with account making is the desire to minimize others’ negative reactions (Itoi
et al., 1996; Struthers, Eaton, Santelli, Uchiyama, & Shirvan, 2008).
In their seminal work on self-presentation, Jones and Pittman (1982) identified
five strategies of self-presentation: ingratiation, self-promotion, intimidation,
exemplification, and supplication. In terms of offenses and self-presentation, ingratiation
fits most closely with the motives of the offender. The purpose of ingratiation is to get
another to view oneself in a positive way; to increase liking. As Jones and Pittman put it,
“the very success of ingratiation usually depends on the actor’s concealment of ulterior
motivation or of the importance of his stake in being judged attractive” (p. 236).
According to Jones and Pittman (1982, p. 237), there are three factors which
affect the effectiveness of ingratiation. The first factor, incentive value, concerns the
importance that a target will like the self-presenter. The higher the incentive value (i.e.,
the more one hopes the target will like him), the greater the ingratiation techniques. For
example, a criminal might hope ingratiation will attract the judge, leading to a more
lenient sentence. The criminal, therefore, might engage in behavior which will ingratiate
himself to the judge in order to increase liking. The second factor Jones and Pittman
identified is subjective probability, as “determined by the subjective probability of its [the
ingratiation technique] success and the inverse probability that a boomerang effect
(decreased attraction) will occur” (p. 237). Jones and Pittman noted the existence of an
ingratiator’s dilemma, which involves an inverse relationship between motivation to
ingratiate and the likelihood of successfully ingratiating. The motivation to ingratiate
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increases as an actor becomes more dependent on the target; at the same time, the
likelihood of successful ingratiation decreases. The proffered explanation for this is that,
as one becomes more dependent on another, the possibility for ulterior motives becomes
salient. To continue with the above example, the criminal is highly dependent on the
judge for a lenient sentence. However, due to this “dependency discrepancy,” the judge
(as well as outside observers) might become more aware of the criminal’s needs and his
likelihood of ingratiating for an ulterior motive. To combat this, the criminal “must go
out of his way to establish his credibility, especially in those settings where extreme
dependence might make his credibility suspect” (p. 237). The final component involves
perceived legitimacy, which involves balancing “authenticity” with “impression
management.” Thus, the criminal will want to make his overtures with an appearance of
sincerity (for a discussion of sincerity, see below), but also in a way that will attract the
judge to him.
In an attempt to repair a relationship, one would most likely employ ingratiation
in order to get the victim to like him or her and, ideally, to promote forgiveness. In his
meta-analysis of the ingratiation literature, Gordon (1996) concluded that ingratiation is
an effective technique for targets; they react more positively after one attempts
ingratiation. Gordon attributes this tendency to people’s inability to remain unaffected
when another has paid them some compliment or reaffirmed their views by agreeing with
them. In terms of apology, when a transgressor offers an apology, she is saying to the
victim, “You are right to be upset with me for my actions. My apology/acceptance of
responsibility is my indication to you that your view of me is correct,” which verifies the
victim’s view of the transgressor and therefore ingratiates the transgressor to the victim.
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Observers, however, are more skeptical, questioning the ingratiator’s motives for his
behavior. Research (e.g., Ohbuchi et al., 2003) has supported this skepticism. Ohbuchi
and colleagues reported that, in the absence of strong mitigating information,
transgressors reported being more concerned with others liking them. Self-presentation
concerns influenced which account transgressors were willing to provide.
Self-promotion is another self-presentation technique which might fit in the realm
of apology and account making. According to Jones and Pittman (1982), self-promotion
does not focus on getting others to see oneself as likable, but rather as competent. If a
doctor is trying to convince his patient to follow a prescribed course of treatment, for
example, it may be less important that the patient like the doctor and more important that
the patient respect the doctor. (It is worth noting, as did Jones and Pittman, that selfpresentation strategies need not be mutually exclusive. It is entirely possible for one to
attract a person via ingratiation and also convince her of one’s competence via selfpromotion.) Self-promotion, like ingratiation, can occur in situations in which power is
not balanced. A student, for example, might try to promote herself to her teacher in order
to show her knowledge of a particular subject. A criminal might engage in selfpromotion by apologizing, effectively relaying that he understands his misdeed and
accepts responsibility for what he has done. In this instance one might interpret his
“competence” as his ability to acknowledge his wrongdoing and offer a socially
acceptable response.
CHAPTER 4: The Effects of Accounts on Victims and Transgressors
As discussed above, transgressors have multiple motives for offering apologies
and accounts when some wrong has occurred. Further, victims have their own motives
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for accepting apologies and sometimes face constraints and pressures to accept such
accounts from transgressors. Although social psychological concepts such as norms and
balance theory can help explain why accounts are offered and accepted, there still remains
the discussion of what effects these accounts have for both the victim and the
transgressor. In this section I will discuss the various effects accounts can have for the
parties involved (and parties not involved). I will also discuss some moderating variables
that can affect the impact of an account.
Effective Apologies
Consistent with the elements Lazare (2006) and Anderson and Prkachin (1998 as
cited in Anderson et al., 2006) laid out, much research has been done to determine what
makes an effective apology. In an early work on the topic, Schlenker and Darby (1981)
had participants rate various accounts. Participants rated perfunctory apologetic
responses (e.g., “Pardon me” or “I’m sorry”) as relatively incomplete, whereas they rated
statements in which the transgressor “offered help or asked for forgiveness as the most
complete” (Schlenker & Darby, 1981, p. 276). (None of the proffered apologies
contained an element of explanation for the event, however; the scenario participants
encountered involved an obvious accident (one person bumping into another in a
crowded place). The authors did suggest, however, that as a wrongdoer’s intent becomes
clearer, self-serving accounts (i.e., excuses, justifications) might be more appropriate.
One reason the “Pardon me” apologies seemed incomplete is that they lacked self-blame.
Participants simply did not see transgressors merely offering an “I’m sorry” as truly
accepting blame for the situation, which is a central aspect of apology. Instead, when
transgressors explicitly blamed themselves for their transgressions, participants viewed
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the apologies as most complete. As Scher and Darley (1997) put it, “an apology without
an expression of remorse (e.g., ‘I apologize’; ‘Pardon me’) generally seems to be
perfunctory or formal, indicating the illocutionary force of apology, without conveying
information about the emotional state of the transgressor” (p. 130). Petrucci (2002, p.
354) provided a list of what the result of a truly effective apology establishes:
[A]n accepted social norm that has been broken is identified; the social identities of the
actors involved are repaired; acceptance of responsibility and expression of regret have
been clearly communicated; forgiveness has occurred; a step toward conflict resolution
has been made; and often punishment has been reduced, ostensibly because harsher
punishments may not be deemed necessary.
In terms of resolving social conflict, participants seem to prefer apologies more
than other types of accounts (Itoi et al., 1996; Schlenker & Darby, 1981). As Schlenker
and Darby (1981) noted, participants rated apologies as the preferred method for dealing
with conflict. One reason for this is that the forbearance inherent in an apology conveys
to the victim that the transgressor regrets her behavior and will take steps to avoid such
behavior in the future, thereby avoiding more infractions (Scher & Darley, 1997). This is
not to say, however, that accounts are not effective in dealing with social conflict. One
study, for example, found that Americans viewed exculpatory explanations and apologies
in the same way, but only when the explanation carried with it the transgressor’s promise
not to engage in similar behavior in the future (Wagatsuma & Rosett, 1986). Fukuno and
Ohbuchi (1998; see also Takaku, 2000) reported that offenders offering what they termed
a “mitigative account” (i.e., excuse or apology) received more positive evaluations than
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offenders offering an “assertive account” (i.e., justification or denial). Mitigative
accounts also helped reduce negative emotions on the part of the victims.
Effects of Accounts on Views of Transgressors
The previous section noted that transgressors often offer accounts as a means of
impression management; they seek to protect their own view of themselves as well as
offer a better image of themselves to victims and observers. As Scher and Darley (1997)
put it, “an apology seeks to change the beliefs of listeners regarding the informativeness
of the transgression regarding the type of person the speaker is” (p. 129). The apology
also helps create two “selves” for the transgressor: the “bad self” responsible for the
harm and the “good self” which is offering the apology and is more characteristic of the
transgressor (Scher & Darley, 1997; Schlenker & Darby, 1981).
Overall, research indicates that apologizing is an effective technique of
impression management. One of the most robust findings in the apology literature is that
people report having more positive views of offenders who offer apologies (and
sometimes other accounts) for their actions (e.g., Goei, Roberto, Meyer, & Carlyle, 2007;
Robbennolt, 2003; Sitkin & Bies, 1993; Takaku, 2000). By apologizing, offenders
acknowledge some norm violation and the victim’s right to feel how she is feeling; the
cost of apologizing (i.e., publicly losing face) might indicate to the victim that the
offender is serious about his apology (Gonzales, Pederson, Manning, & Wetter, 1990),
which might lead to more positive judgments by the victims. Similarly, Ohbuchi et al.
(1989) noted that participants not only preferred transgressors who apologized over those
who did not, but they also had less negative feelings toward them and were less inclined
to react aggressively toward them. Some research has even suggested that in cases where
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doctors apologize to patients the number of medical malpractice suits decreases
(Newfield, 2007). Even children demonstrate the tendency to judge apologizers more
favorably. Ohbuchi and Sato (2001) gathered data from fifth-graders, whose reactions
were similar to those of adults: When a transgressor apologized for his actions, the fifthgraders had more positive reactions. Specifically, they believed him less at fault for the
action, they assigned more remorse to him, and they did not blame him as much for what
transpired.
An important element influencing impressions of offenders is perceived remorse
for an action. As Lazare (2004, p. 107) conceptualized it, remorse is a “deep, painful
regret that is part of the guilt people experience when they have done something wrong.”
An essential element of remorse, according to Lazare, involves accepting responsibility;
one must accept responsibility for the outcome of one’s actions and focus on the harm
one caused (Semin & Manstead, 1983). Remorse, if sincere, should also indicate
forbearance on the part of the offender; essentially promising to avoid such harm-causing
behavior in the future. This can lead to less negative impressions of the harmdoer on the
part of the victim (Semin & Manstead, 1983). A lack of remorse, on the other hand,
might indicate that the offender “may not share the moral standards of the rest of society
and, thus, is at risk to repeat the wrongful act” (Lazare, 2004, p. 111).
Although apologies generally produce more positive outcomes for transgressors, they
sometimes actually increase negative evaluations. One instance in which this often
occurs is when no clear harmdoer exists. In one study, denial proved more effective than
apology at rebuilding trust between parties, but only in cases where evidence of the
harmdoer’s innocence existed (Kim et al., 2004). When a party apologizes and his guilt
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is not clear, participants may react more negatively. This is just what Zechmeister,
Garcia, Romero, and Vas (2004) found. Their results showed that participants displayed
increased blame for experimenters and had more retaliatory responses toward them when
they apologized for administering an incorrect test than when they offered no apology.
The authors posited that this occurred because, before receiving (or not receiving) an
apology, the experimenters’ culpability was unclear. When they apologized, however,
they assumed the culpability and therefore it became easier to blame them for the
negative outcome. Boccaccini, Clark, John, and Mundt (2008) reported similar results.
They had participants read Kobe Bryant’s public statement stemming from charges of
sexual assault. The authors manipulated whether Bryant’s statement was the actual one
issued (which contained an apology) or whether the statement contained no apology but
instead contained an expression of vindication for having the criminal charges dropped.
The results showed that, overall, participants, regardless of condition, did not believe
Bryant was guilty of sexual assault or that the accuser deserved monetary compensation.
Of the participants who believed in Bryant’s guilt, however, significantly more read the
statement containing the apology rather than the vindication. One possible interpretation
for these findings is that Bryant’s guilt was not clear and therefore reading the apology
made it appear as though he was accepting responsibility for something he might not
have done.
In cases of clear guilt, wrongdoers fared better with a confession and worse with a
denial. Weiner and colleagues (1991) and Robbennolt (2003) reported that a partial
apology was actually harmful for the transgressor when the responsibility for the incident
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was clear, but was somewhat beneficial when the responsibility was somewhat more
ambiguous.
Sometimes the victim’s reaction to a negative event affects whether he will
receive any type of account. A number of researchers (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1990) have
noted that if a victim does not draw attention to the negative event, offenders might not
be likely to offer any account because they are unaware of having caused offense. The
authors went on to remark that if an offender continues this behavior, the victim might
eventually react in a strong way, due to his negative feelings having built up. The
offender, on the other hand, is likely to see this as an overreaction and not apologize,
believing the victim to be overly sensitive. Similarly, Exline and colleagues (2007)
reported that victims were more likely to receive apologies if they confronted the
transgressor in a way that was neither hostile nor vengeful.
Cohen (1999) also laid out some risks for apologizers. In terms of benefits,
Cohen noted that apologizing might help the transgressor “develop ‘internal strength’ and
‘character’” (p. 7), but also opens the transgressor up to negative judgments.
Specifically, Cohen suggested that apologizing might make one seem weak to observers,
and noted further that it is the desire to avoid this that prevents some parties from
apologizing.
Independent of others’ judgments, Cohen (1999) also suggested that apologizing
might in some ways be damaging to an offender. He observed that some people might
consider apologizing to be a demeaning act, as it “requires humbling oneself before
another and admitting a wrongdoing” (p. 7). Further, if one does apologize but has her
apology rejected, she may experience shame, resentment, or any other negative emotions.
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Some people, then, might avoid offering apologies to save themselves from potential
negative psychological effects.
Effects of Accounts on Views of Transgressors in the Legal System
Several authors have explored the effect of (perceived) remorse on impressions of
wrongdoers, especially in legal situations. Bornstein and his colleagues (2002), for
example, found that participants judged a wrongdoer less negatively when he offered an
apology than when he did not. Further, expressing remorse improved views of a civil
defendant. Participants did not differentiate between a defendant who did not mention
feeling remorse and a defendant who explicitly denied being remorseful. Remorse, then,
appears to play a central role in observations of offenders; if one does not appear
remorseful, an apology or account will do little to improve his image. In their research
looking into perceptions of drunk drivers, Taylor and Kleinke (1992) reported similar
results. Specifically, participants rated drunk drivers as more responsible and sensitive
when they expressed remorse rather than denied it. In another study, Kleinke, Wallis,
and Stalder (1992) reported that rapists who expressed remorse received less severe
evaluations from participants.
Niedermeier and colleagues (1999; 2001) also examined the effects of remorse on
impressions of defendants, but reported some negative effects of expressing remorse. In
one study (1999, Experiment 2), the authors noted interesting interactions between
defendant status and expressions of remorse. Consistent with previous research, the
authors reported that expressing remorse improved views of a defendant, but only when
he was of relatively low status (a medical resident). When the defendant was of high
status (a medical director) expressions of remorse actually led to more guilty verdicts
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than when he expressed no remorse. In another series of studies, Niedermeier et al.
(2001, Study 2) found that when mock jurors deemed a law fair (as opposed to unfair),
expressions of remorse actually led to rating the defendant as more guilty. Referring to it
as a “remorse guilt explanation,” the authors suggested that, because the law was “fair,”
mock jurors viewed the expression of remorse as incriminating. This result can help
explain why people are often wary of offering an apology or expressing remorse; many
feel to do so would open them to some type of sanction (e.g., legal).
Legal Safeguards for Apologies
Although apologies can have healing benefits, one of the biggest drawbacks to
offering an apology is the fear that others will see it as an admission of fault or liability,
leading to serious consequences, such as legal action (i.e., lawsuits). If one bumps into
someone on a crowded street and issues a hurried, “I’m sorry,” she will likely face no
serious consequences of her apology. A doctor who misdiagnoses a patient, however,
leading to more health complications, might fear that a sincere “I’m sorry” will indicate
negligence and hence liability. Indeed, this is one of the reasons doctors frequently cite
for failure to apologize. According to Gallagher and colleagues (2003), doctors worry
that such expressions will open them up to legal action from patients (or patients’
families). Another insightful piece of research comes from Vincent and Young (1994).
Although their research took place in the United Kingdom, which has a healthcare system
different from that in the United States, the findings of their research might still shed
some light on medical malpractice situations in the United States. In a survey of people
currently involved in medical malpractice litigation, Vincent and Young found that the
majority of their respondents (90%) reported feeling angry about the incident.
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Respondents also reported feelings of bitterness, betrayal, and humiliation. The authors
also found that, if there was an explanation, respondents felt largely dissatisfied, seeing
the explanation as “unclear, inaccurate, and lacking information” (p. 4). This coincides
with what Gallagher et al. (2003) found. In their sample, patients wanted full disclosure
from their doctor. It seems likely, then, that failure to disclose medical errors fully can
lead to an increased probability of a lawsuit. Similarly, in only 13% of Vincent and
Young’s (1994) sample did the apologizer either fully or partially accept responsibility,
and on only 15% of the occasions did the apologizer offer a full or partial apology.
Considering that apologies necessarily involve accepting responsibility for the action and
its consequences, doctors might find that their fears are not unfounded.
Vincent and Young (1994) identified four main reasons for litigation. First,
respondents reported that they wished to see staff held accountable for errors. Second,
respondents sought an explanation for what happened. Third, respondents wanted to
ensure that a similar transgression would not happen again in the future. Finally,
respondents reported that they wanted “compensation and an admission of negligence”
(p. 4). These reasons fall in line with the elements of an apology. First, the actor and
victim must recognize the harm. Respondents might see the doctor as being held
accountable if the doctor admits some responsibility, which is the second element of an
apology. Finally, the implication that a similar transgression will not happen in the future
is another essential element of an apology. It seems, then, that an apology could have a
significant effect on a person’s desire to bring a lawsuit against a doctor (or hospital,
clinic, and so forth). An apology will satisfy most of the reasons people provided for
beginning litigation (except for, perhaps, the need for compensation).
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In response to concern that apologizing will result in legal action, a number of
states have taken steps to provide legal safeguards for a wrongdoer (especially a
physician) who offers an apology. According to McDonnell and Guenther (2008), as of
March 31, 2008, 36 states (including the District of Columbia) provide some form of
legal safeguard, eliminating or greatly restricting evidence allowed concerning the
voluntary disclosure of medical errors by physicians. Further, 28 of these 36 states’
“laws prevent the use of expressions of sympathy, regret and condolence against the
physician in subsequent litigation” (p. 812), protecting physicians from not only
apologizing, but offering another form of communication typically associated with
apologizing (e.g., expressing regret). (For comprehensive reviews, see Cohen, 2002;
Ebert, 2008; Landsman, 2008; McDonnell & Guenther, 2008; Newfield, 2007).
One of the states pioneering this movement was Massachusetts which, in 1986,
passed a law protecting “statements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy
or a general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or death of a person
involved in an accident and made to such person or to the family of such person shall be
inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action” (Massachusetts
General Laws ch. 233, Section 23D). This law came about after a state senator’s
daughter was killed when the bike she was riding was struck by a car. The father was
upset that the driver offered no expression of sympathy or remorse for his action. Upon
learning that the driver feared the legal consequences of such an expression, the senator
sought to have such statements protected (Taft, 2000). Deemed “sympathy laws,” the
purpose of these laws is to allow transgressors to offer some expression of sympathy or
condolence without fear of legal retaliation (e.g., Newfield, 2007).
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Since Massachusetts’ adoption of this protectionist law, other states have
followed suit. The extent of their protection varies, however. For example, California
and Texas protect expressions of sympathy (e.g., “I’m sorry”), but fault-admitting
apologies (e.g., “This is all my fault”) are admissible to establish liability (Cal. Evid.
Code § 1160; Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 18.061). Similarly, if an
expression of benevolence contains a fault-admitting statement (“I’m sorry that I hurt
you”), the fault-admitting portion of the statement is admissible (e.g., Fla. Stat. §
90.4026). In the examples listed, statements by anyone (including physicians) are
protected. Ebert (2008) suggested that these expressions of sympathy do little to pacify
patient complaints because, as a true apology necessarily contains an admission of
blameworthiness, doctors are not offering true apologies, so their expressions of
sympathy might not have healing effects.
Some states, however, protect even fault-admitting statements of sympathy.
Colorado’s statute, for example, deals expressly with the health-care industry (Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 13-25-135 (2009); Or. Rev. Stat. § 677.082 (2003)). The relevant portion
provides that care providers are protected in cases in which they apologize (including a
full admission of fault) for an unanticipated outcome resulting from medical error. Thus,
a doctor can offer a full apology, including the necessary component of admitting fault,
without fear that any part of his apology may later be used in evidence against him.
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) also deal with admissibility issues. Rules
408 and 801 are particularly relevant. FRE 801 (d)(2), for example, allows statements of
fault admission to be admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule. An admission,
according to the rule is, “the party’s own statement, in either an individual or
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representative capacity.” Therefore, any statement made outside of settlement
negotiations or mediation can be used. Such a rule is likely to affect most people’s
decision to offer some statement of sympathy. FRE 408 also affords protection, dictating
that statements made during settlement negotiations are not admissible in order to prove
liability. A physician, for example, who offers an apology during negotiations, cannot
have his apology used later at trial as evidence of his liability.
Apologies are not the only type of account receiving legal protection, however.
The law recognizes justification as a means of receiving a reduced sentence or some kind
of protection. Justification, as discussed above, involves admission of an action and its
relation to an adverse outcome, but the actor claims some circumstance made his action
permissible and he therefore should not be held accountable for the outcome. Selfdefense laws, for example, protect individuals from legal sanction for effectively
violating the law. For example, if I hit someone who is attacking me and break his nose,
I have committed battery. Because I can justify my action, however (i.e., defending
myself), the legal ramifications I face will be less than if I offered no justification for my
action. According to Schopp (1993), “those who raise justification defenses contend that
although they have engaged in conduct that fulfills the material elements of a criminal
offense, circumstances render that conduct socially acceptable and perhaps even desirable
and, thus, immune from punishment” (p. 1237-1238). Schopp went on to note that
justification defenses apply to anyone in the same situation: Self-defense, for example,
would apply to anyone who hit her attacker and broke his nose in order to prevent an
imminent attack.
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Excuses, on the other hand, are more person-specific (Schopp, 1993). As the
discussion above established, excuses involve recognition of the connection between
one’s action and its outcome, but seeks an outside cause for the outcome. For example,
Bobby might admit throwing the ball in the house and subsequently breaking Carol’s
vase, but might claim that his dog, Tiger, bumped into him, causing his throw to go in an
unintended direction.2 As Schopp (1993) argued, excuse would not extend to everyone in
that situation; only Bobby can make the excuse of Tiger’s interference.
Effects for Victims
Aside from benefits for transgressors, apologies can also prove beneficial for
those on the receiving end. Physically, apologies helped to lower blood pressure in
victims with high trait hostility following a provocation (Anderson et al., 2006). Lawler,
Younger, Piferi, Jobe, Edmondson, and Jones (2005; see also McCullough, 2000;
Witvliet, 2001; Witvliet, Ludwig, & Vander Laan, 2001) similarly reported that
forgiveness has positive physiological effects, such as reduced negative affect and stress.
The majority of benefits, however, are not tangible. Not only do apologies serve to save
the face of the transgressor, they also help save the face of the victim (Gonzales et al.,
1990). Accounts might not serve to wholly repair the victim’s face, but they do validate
the victim’s feelings and interpretations of the harm-causing situation. By offering an
apology, for example, an offender is saying, “I have done something wrong. You are
right to feel what you are feeling. I value and respect you as a person.”
One major benefit to victims concerns the psychological effects apologies
produce. For example, when given the opportunity to voice their concerns over a
procedurally unfair act, participants had more positive evaluations of the act, especially if
2

My apologies to “The Brady Bunch” for taking liberties with its storyline.
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the harmdoer (in this case an authority figure) apologized (DeCremer & Schouten, 2008;
see also Goodwin & Ross, 1992). When the authority figure showed respect, this effect
became even more pronounced. DeCremer and Schouten suggested that giving victims a
voice after a transgression conveys respect. Victims interpreted this act, coupled with an
apology, as an indication that the authority figure was sincere in his apology and also that
he had a genuine interest in the victims’ welfare, which increased victims’ belief about
the amount of respect the other had for them. Further, Sitkin and Bies (1993) noted that
explanations (not limited to apology) convey respect to subordinates, especially when the
explanation is not required. According to the authors, an unrequired explanation
communicates to the subordinate that he is important and deserves an explanation for
another’s actions. Petrucci (2002) echoed these sentiments, noting that crime victims
often seek apologies, which have the potential to decrease anger and thereby reduce
aggression. By letting go of such negative feelings, victims are then able to move
forward. Not receiving an apology, on the other hand, often leaves victims with the
feeling that no one has recognized their pain and suffering (Regehr & Gutheil, 2002).
Overall, participants indicate that they recognize the benefits of accepting
apologies (Risen & Gilovich, 2007). Further, participants have reported knowing that
others would judge them more positively for accepting an offered apology. Sometimes,
however, participants do not accept proffered apologies. Although relatively rare, this
rejection can negatively affect their relationship with the transgressor (see discussion
above), and can also negatively impact observers’ views of them. Risen and Gilovich
(2007; see also Bennett & Dewberry, 1994) researched what happened to impressions of
victims when they rejected apologies. Overall, the authors found that people judged
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victims more harshly when they rejected apologies. Interestingly, whether the apology
was sincere or insincere did not matter; simply refusing an offered apology led to
negative views of the victim. Therefore, victims might accept apologies in order to save
face in front of others.
Restorative Justice
Restorative justice offers one way to bring about a change to the victim-offender
relationship. Simply put, restorative justice seeks to return victims, their families, and
those affected by a transgression, to their original state (Strickland, 2004). Unlike
traditional forms of punishment, however, restorative justice also focuses on helping
offenders make amends for what they have done. Kurki (2000, p. 265) outlined how
restorative justice differs from the traditional criminal justice process. First, restorative
justice considers the crime in a broader context. It does not focus solely on the people
involved, but looks to the broader community for effects of the crime. Second, because
of this broader spectrum, more people become “empowered” in the process. Finally,
restorative justice concerns itself with how well the parties’ needs are met. The concern
is less with punitive measures and more with healing measures. Additionally, Petrucci
(2002) stated that restorative justice has important implications, such as conflict
resolution and, more importantly, allowing the victim to be a more active participant in
the criminal justice process.
The idea of restorative justice is not a new one. For example, the Babylonian
Code (c. 1700 B.C.), the Sumerian Code of UrNammu (c. 2060 B.C.), and the Roman
Law of the Twelve Tables (449 B.C.) all had provisions for restitution to the victim from
the offender. (For a more complete discussion, see Bazemore, 1998, p. 772.) Bazemore
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went on to outline the benefits of restorative justice for the victim, such as “hope of
restitution or other forms of reparation, information about the case, the opportunity to be
heard, and the input into the case as well as expanded opportunities for involvement and
influence” (p. 771). Stubbs (2007) echoed these benefits, listing harm reparation as the
main focus of restorative justice. She went on to comment that, through restorative
justice, victims have the opportunity to express themselves and gain some amount of
control over the situation. Victims also play a role in the matter’s resolution, gaining
more insight into the incident and into the offender’s motivation for her action.
CHAPTER 5: Variables Affecting Account Usefulness
One factor which can affect the impact of an apology is how complete the
apology itself is. Robbennolt (2003) examined the effects of different forms of apologies
on participants’ views of a transgressor and their subsequent willingness to accept
settlement offers. In terms of impressions of the transgressor, Robbennolt found that,
when offered a full apology (i.e., the transgressor accepted responsibility for the
consequences of his action), participants had more positive views of the offender. They
believed him to be more regretful, more moral, and more likely to be cautious in the
future. Participants also believed the transgressor accepted more responsibility for his
actions and judged his actions more favorably. Full apologies also reduced victims’
feelings of anger and increased feelings of sympathy for the transgressor.
In terms of accepting settlements for their injuries, Robbennolt’s (2003) research
provided evidence for the positive effects of full apologies. She reported that participants
were more willing to accept a settlement offer when it accompanied a full apology, and
participants further indicated the settlement would be more reparative when it came with
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a full apology. In contrast, when participants received only a partial apology, they were
less inclined to accept the offer; and they became unsure about what course of action to
pursue. These data suggest that if a full apology in itself is not sufficient to repair the
damage to a relationship, it can make an offer of reparation more palatable to the victim.
Another factor influencing the effectiveness of various accounts is the trust
relationship between the transgressor and the victim. Kim and colleagues (2004) reported
that the type of trust existing between the transgressor and victim affects what type of
account will be most effective. In this instance, trust is a “psychological state comprising
the intention to accept vulnerability” (p. 104). The results of their study showed that an
apology was most effective at enhancing one’s image and rebuilding trust between the
parties, but only when the harm caused was due to a “competence-based” violation, that
is, a violation based on one’s ability. If the harm was “integrity-based” (i.e., based on
moral character), on the other hand, the researchers found that denial was actually the
most effective means of rebuilding trust and improving one’s image.
The law also recognizes certain relationships – called fiduciary relationships – as
relationships of trust. A fiduciary relationship exists where one (e.g., a doctor) has a
special obligation of loyalty, a responsibility to act in another’s (e.g., a patient) best
interest. Co-workers, for example, are not involved in fiduciary relationships; in the law,
as a general rule, strangers have no moral or legal obligation to act in the best interest of
another whom they do not know. A doctor, however, is legally obligated to act in the
best interest of his patient. As Forell and Sortun (2009) stated, breaches of fiduciary duty
greatly differ from more common competence-based breaches of trust. They contended
that an obligation of loyalty places the fiduciary relationship on a higher plane than other

45
relationships, because the fiduciary relationship is typically one-way (e.g., a doctor must
act in his patient’s best interest, but the patient owes no such loyalty to his doctor) and
involves a scenario in which one party is dependent on the other party. This dependence
reflects a significant power imbalance in the relationship. When a harm occurs,
therefore, the resulting imbalance might be greater than in a non-fiduciary relationship.
Because of this delicate balance, fiduciaries might be less willing to apologize because of
the possible legal consequences of breaching the fiduciary duty and also the personal
implications. A doctor who breaches her relationship with a patient, for example, might
be unwilling to apologize because of her fear of legal retaliation but also because
apologizing might mean admitting that the patient was wrong for having trusted the
doctor with her care, which can negatively impact the doctor’s view of herself as well as
others’ views of her competence, her reputation, and so forth.
Essential in rebuilding relationships is forgiveness. The majority of research on
forgiveness and apology indicates that an apology paves the way for forgiveness in a
variety of relationships. Hodgins and Liebeskind (2003) observed that people judge their
friends more positively when they accept responsibility for some event, but acting
defensively actually has a negative impact on forgiveness. Leary et al. (1998) offered an
explanation, arguing that people in close relationships have more invested in one another
and therefore have more visceral reactions to transgressions from close others than from
strangers. Indeed, feeling accepted or rejected by the other highly correlated with how
hurt the victim felt by the event. When we feel rejected by a close other, the
disassociation is more threatening and therefore more painful. We might also forgive
close others because of feelings of obligation and also feelings that we have invested so
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much in the relationship that ruining it would not be worth it, so we forgive (Kelley,
1998).
McCullough, Worthington, and Rachal (1997) noted that forgiveness is essential
for relationship repair in romantic relationships. As these authors noted, when people
forgave their romantic partners, they became less interested in self-protective behaviors
and instead sought relationship-constructive actions, even at a personal cost. Similarly,
Gunderson and Ferrari (2008) examined forgiveness in imaginary romantic relationships.
They reported positive effects for apologies. Specifically, subjects reported that, if a
romantic partner offered an apology for cheating, it would take less time and would be
easier to forgive the partner, further reporting that they would be more likely to remain in
the relationship. They further projected their positive feelings toward the future,
indicating that they felt more hopeful about the future of the relationship. This effect
only emerged when the partner cheated one time. However, when the partner had a
history of cheating, the apology did little to affect forgiveness. One interpretation is that,
with repeated cheating, an apology loses its effectiveness because an essential element
(i.e., promising to refrain from the harm-causing behavior in the future) is missing.
Either it is not a part of the statement or it is implied but not realized. An habitual cheater
has demonstrated that she will not refrain from this behavior, thus a crucial element is
missing from the apology (even if the offender explicitly states her intention of avoiding
this behavior, her record would indicate otherwise), which renders it ineffective. Lending
support to this supposition, Kremer and Stephens (1983) found evidence that mitigating
accounts lose their effectiveness in the presence of subsequent provocations.
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Another factor which influences one’s willingness to accept an apology is the
severity of the event and its consequences. Bennett and Earwaker (1994), for example,
found a strong relationship between anger and severity; apologies helped reduce anger,
especially when an event’s consequences were not serious. Fukuno and Ohbuchi (1998)
similarly reported that mitigative accounts (i.e., apology and excuse) were more effective
than assertive accounts (i.e., justification and denial), even in the face of severe harm.
Similarly, Robbennolt (2003) reported that partial apologies were somewhat helpful
when an injury was relatively minor but negatively impacted perceptions of the
transgressor when the injury was severe. Ohbuchi and colleagues (1989) reported that
victims’ desire for an apology lessened as the harm became less severe.

Severity also

influences the punishments for the offender. Taylor and Kleinke (1992) found, for
instance, that participants levied more severe sanctions (e.g., fines, prison sentences)
against drunk drivers when the harm was severe. Interestingly, severity was the only
manipulation which determined the fine and prison sentence. Even though participants
had less negative views of the driver when he expressed remorse, only severity predicted
punitive responses.
Interestingly, the severity of an action’s consequences can determine what
account one offers (Itoi et al., 1996; McLaughlin et al., 1983). As Schlenker and Darby
(1981) put it, “the severity of the predicament is directly related to both the use of the
nonperfunctory apologies and the number of components employed in such apologies”
(p. 275). Overall, it appears the more serious the event or its consequences become, the
more the victim seeks an apology and the more an offender feels the need to offer one.
One reason for this might be that one views the actor as more responsible for the event as
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the outcome becomes more severe (e.g., Schlenker & Darby, 1981; Walster, 1966).
Schlenker and Darby (1981) noted that, when an event’s consequences are minimal,
people offer perfunctory apologies, such as “Pardon me” or “I’m sorry.” As
consequences become more severe, however, people reported being more likely to offer
more complete apologies and, as responsibility increased, people were also more willing
to ask for forgiveness outright. In general, as severity increased, so too did the offender’s
likelihood of using a mitigative rather than an assertive account. In the most severe
conditions, transgressors favored apologies.
Timing also plays a role in apology acceptance. Frequently people offer
apologies immediately after they have realized their harmful act. McPherson-Frantz and
Benningson (2005), however, noted that this can be problematic, as apologizing too soon
might place the victim in an uncomfortable role as she might not be ready for deescalation. The authors hypothesized that later apologies would be most effective
because the victim will have had a chance to express herself and feel heard. And this is,
in fact, what the authors found. They reported that apologies offered after the victim had
a chance to express concern and feel heard were more successful than apologies offered
before expression and voice. However, early apologies were still more effective than
offering no apology at all.
Not all researchers advocate allowing time to lapse between a transgression and
apology, however. Kremer and Stephens (1983), for example, noted that people are more
likely to retaliate as the gap between the provocation and mitigation lengthens. Lazare
(2006) agreed, recommending that doctors apologize as soon as they become aware of a
medical error. As he observed, when people are aware of a delay between a harmful
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event and apology, they view the delay as disrespectful or deceitful. As mentioned
above, respect plays a key role in rebuilding relationships. Anything that destroys
respect, then, might make the apology less effective. In an empirical study of timing,
Bornstein et al. (2002) reported that plaintiffs received greater compensation when a
physician expressed remorse at the time of the error and again at trial. Interestingly no
difference in compensation emerged when the doctor expressed remorse at the trial
versus when he expressed no remorse at all.
While it is clear from the literature on apologies that they can have healing
effects, some people remain guarded when receiving an apology. One reason people
might be reluctant to accept an apology has to do with the transgressor’s (perceived)
motivation for apologizing. A criminal on trial, for example, might apologize to the
victim’s family in order to receive a reduced sentence from a judge (Petrucci, 2002;
Wagatsuma & Rosett, 1986). Generally, as discussed above, people also offer apologies
to present themselves in a positive light or restore their self-image. Indeed, Gonzales et
al. (1990, p. 618) proposed that “accounts are typically conceived as ‘self-serving’
impression management vehicles for controlling the inferences and subsequent evaluative
and affective responses of parties witness to or harmed by a social transgression.” What
are people’s reactions to apologies when they believe the transgressor is only apologizing
to gain some benefit for him- or herself?
Kim and colleagues (2004) suggested that a person’s perceived integrity weighs
heavily on the attributions one will make of him. According to the authors, people
assume that people of perceived high integrity will not act inappropriately in any
situation. People with perceived low integrity, on the other hand, “may exhibit either
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dishonest or honest behaviors depending on their incentives and opportunities” (p. 106).
The authors went on to note, further, that a single honest behavior does not prove
particularly diagnostic, but a single dishonest behavior indicates someone with low
integrity, as a person with high integrity would not engage in any dishonest behavior.
Similarly, in their research on persuasion, Weiner and Mowen (1986) found that when
people suspected a source of harboring ulterior motives (in this case trying to sell an
automobile), subjects generally devalued that product (e.g., they considered the
automobile to be of lower value).
Cases of defendants (civil or criminal) may certainly fit the credentials outlined
above; simply being a defendant may lend itself to general mistrust, especially with jurors
harboring proprosecution biases (e.g., Wrightsman, 1987). Thus, if a defendant makes an
apology in court, it follows that people will be skeptical of the message and messenger.
Indeed, Lazare (2006) noted that in many cases, apologies have no impact because of
their “fraudulence, insincerity, or disingenuousness” (p. 1403). Weiner and colleagues
(1991) found that when one confesses after an accusation, observers tended to attribute
this to mere impression management, and it is therefore not wholly beneficial to the
transgressor.
In their review of American and Japanese law regarding apology in a legal
context, Wagatsuma and Rosett (1986) noted that American courts (both civil and
criminal) do not require any expression of remorse or regret from defendants, unlike their
Japanese counterparts. The authors further noted that requiring some form of apology
would likely make the act seem insincere and forced, which might make victims less
willing to accept the apology (see also, Cohen, 1999; Exline et al., 2007). Further,
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Skarlicki, Folger, and Gee (2004) reported that when participants perceived a partner’s
social account as a manipulative tactic, it lost effectiveness. As participants saw their
partners as using social accounts in a more manipulative way, they held less positive
views of them and had more negative reactions to their partners.
Questionable motives do not always an insincere apology make, however. Risen
and Gilovich (2007) conducted research examining the effects of spontaneous and
coerced apologies. They found that wronged parties had consistent reactions to
spontaneous and coerced apologies. In both conditions, targets liked the transgressor the
same amount and thought he should be paid the same amount for his efforts in a task.
Observers, on the other hand--that is, people watching the victim/transgressor interaction
but having no direct involvement--did rate the transgressor differently depending on the
type of apology offered. When the transgressor offered a spontaneous apology, observers
liked him significantly more than when he offered a coerced apology. Further, observers
suggested paying the harmdoer who offered a spontaneous apology 14% more. Offering
a coerced apology decreased the transgressor’s likeability and also led to impressions that
he experienced less remorse for the harm caused. Interestingly, when there was no
apology present, observers had more positive ratings of the transgressor and wanted to
pay him more than when he offered a coerced apology. In terms of observers’
judgments, even when the harm was made salient, offering no apology was more
beneficial to the harmdoer than was offering a coerced apology. As Risen and Gilovich
put it, “the coerced apology was worse than no apology, and the failure to offer an
apology seemed to work as well as offering a spontaneous apology” (p. 424). Thus,
while those directly involved with an offense might respond positively to offenders who

52
apologize, regardless of motivation, the court of public opinion might not be so forgiving.
One potential explanation for this distinction has to do with norms (discussed above);
victims likely face norms to accept apologies that observers do not. Another possibility
is that observers see the transgressor as ingratiating, which works more effectively on
actors than bystanders, probably because actors (as opposed to observers) are motivated
to accept others’ positive reactions (e.g., compliments) toward them (Jones & Pittman,
1982).
Another possibility, however, is that victims and observers might view offenders
who willingly apologize in a public forum (such as a courtroom) as more sincere, because
of the very setting in which they offer the apology. Instead of offering an apology to the
victim him/herself, by acknowledging one’s misconduct and accepting responsibility in a
public place, an offender might be conveying an impression of one who is truly sorry and
willing to admit fault. As evidence of this, Ohbuchi and colleagues (1989) found that
participants rated research assistants as more responsible when the assistant apologized in
front of the experimenter than when she apologized to the victim alone. The authors
suggested that perceivers viewed the research assistant as acting in a personally costly
way, which, perhaps, increased her credibility. Thus, an apology offered publicly, while
viewed suspiciously by some, might have more positive effects for the offender than an
apology offered privately. Also, offenders who apologize publicly might convey a
deeper sense of shame for their wrongdoing.
Determining an Apology’s Sincerity
Apologies and remorse abound in criminal justice settings (Niedermeier,
Horowitz, & Kerr, 1999, 2001) – defendants are especially likely to use them, either
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sincerely or instrumentally, to get more lenient sentences. According to Bibas and
Bierschbach (2004, p. 94), expressions of remorse “indicate that an offender is not ‘lost,’
that he has some self-transformative capacity that justifies (or requires) a lesser
punishment.” The United States Sentencing Commission even contains provisions for
the expression of remorse (1994, p. 72-73). And Petrucci (2002) explained that apologies
can help establish either “acceptance of responsibility” or “mitigating circumstances;”
either of which can result in a reduced sentence. Accepting responsibility, according to
Petrucci’s (2002) review, can have a large effect on sentence reduction. Specifically, she
noted that early admissions of guilt and cooperation with officials are major determinants
in sentence reduction. One aspect of a defendant’s apology involves admission of guilt,
without which there is no “acceptance of responsibility” and therefore no sentence
reduction (U.S. v. Williams, 1991). (For a more complete review of case law, see
Petrucci, 2002.)
Given the motivation for offenders to lie, how does one judge a true apology from
an untrue apology? The following section will delve into research in the area of
deception detection. A distinction is warranted, however. The research on apology
above dealt with sincerity, while the research regarding deception detection deals with
believability. Although the two concepts may be related, they are distinct. An account
may be both sincere and believable, since the two are not mutually exclusive: But an
account may be sincere without being believed, or may be believed without being
sincere. According to the literature (e.g., Moran, 2005), sincerity resides within the
individual. When one internalizes his feelings and attempts to express them, he is said to
be sincere. A defendant, then, may truly feel badly for his actions and internalize his
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negative emotions (e.g., guilt). The negative feelings generated by his guilt might then
lead to feelings of remorse, which he might try to express to another party (e.g., the
victim, the court). Believability, on the other hand, focuses more on the observer’s
perception of the transgressor’s statement. Because the observer cannot see into the
transgressor’s mind, it is entirely possible for a transgressor to be completely sincere in
his apology but not have it believed. As Moran (2005, p. 342) put it, “We value sincerity
in speech … because it is the closest we can come to unmediated access to the genuine
state of mind of the person with whom we are communicating.” He continued,
[S]incerity matters to speech because its presence is our guarantee that
what the speaker says is an accurate representation of what he actually
believes. If what we hear from a speaker is to be believable, it is because
the speech we hear provides us with access to what the speaker’s own
beliefs are, and his statements will be believable only to the extent that we
are counting on his beliefs on this matter to be reliable. (italics in original)

The opposite is also possible: A transgressor may offer an entirely insincere
statement, but the observer may believe its veracity. Research in the realm of apologies
and accounts, however, has focused on the apologizer’s (perceived) sincerity and not
believability.
Kraut (1978) identified two types of information available to determine deception.
He suggested people look at performance cues, in which “the audience perceives that an
actor has failed to adequately control some aspect of his deceptive performance” (p. 389).
He also suggested that people consider the actor’s motivational cues, which arise in
situations apart from the actor’s performance. These motivation cues “provide standards
against which a performance is judged” (p. 390). A job interview, for example, involves
self-presentation. An audience, therefore, would judge the actor’s self-presentation in
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that situation against their standard for self-presentation in a job interview to determine if
deception was likely to have occurred. Seiter, Bruschke, and Bai (2002) commented that
a deceiver’s motivation for lying is the most important factor in determining the lie’s
acceptability. Not surprisingly, the more the deception is intended to benefit someone
other than the liar, the more people report the deception as acceptable. Interestingly, the
selfishness or selflessness of an offender’s apology does not seem to affect a recipient’s
willingness to accept it. As Hareli and Eisikovits (2006) reported, whether guilt or shame
motivated an offender’s apology, recipients were equally likely to forgive.
Kashy and DePaulo (1996) commented that “publicly self-conscious” individuals
lied more. A defendant, one likely made “publicly self-conscious,” then might find
herself more predisposed to lie than tell the truth. The authors further noted that, “people
tell lies to accomplish the most basic social interaction goals, such as influencing others,
managing impressions, and providing reassurance and support” (p. 1037), and research
on lying indicates that it factors heavily into daily life (e.g., Kashy & DePaulo, 1996).
DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, and Epstein (1996), for example, had participants
keep diaries of how often they told lies in their everyday interactions. Among their
sample of community members, the researchers found that people reported lying about
once per day; college students averaged two lies per day. Moreover, the researchers
found that the overwhelming majority of lies told (more than 80%) were at least partially
about the liar him- or herself (e.g., about one’s own feelings, thoughts, opinions).
Furthermore, people reported lying based on self-serving motives, especially if the
benefit of the lie would be psychic (rather than materialistic). The results indicated that
people were about twice as likely to tell a self-serving lie as one intended to benefit other
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people. Finally, participants reported that, when lying, they expected others to believe
their lies. And, in fact, Elaad (2003) reported that people are better able to conceal than
detect lies.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear a case addressing
constitutional protection under the First Amendment’s Free Speech clause for lying
(United States v. Alvarez). The Stolen Valor Act (18 U.S.C. § 704(b)) prohibits an
individual from “falsely represent[ing] himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have
been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of
the United States…”. In January 2012 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
Act, acknowledging that “false statements of fact do not enjoy constitutional protection,
except to the extent necessary to protect more valuable speech” (United States v.
Strandlof, 2012, p. 3). Noting that upholding the Stolen Valor Act did nothing to
“impinge or chill protected speech” (p. 3) the Tenth Circuit argued the act did not violate
the First Amendment. In a different case the Ninth Circuit struck down the Act, noting
that the Act must pass strict scrutiny, which, the Ninth Circuit opined, the Stolen Valor
Act does not. These conflicting holdings led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in
Alvarez, in which they will, essentially, determine the constitutionality of lying, at least
about certain subjects.
Social skills can also affect the frequency with which people lie. Kashy and
DePaulo (1996) reported that people with greater social skills lied significantly more than
did people with less developed social skills. Further, in their sample of college students,
social skills significantly predicted everyday lying.
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Overall, how do people do when trying to detect lying? The majority of the
evidence indicates that people are poor lie detectors. DePaulo and Pfeifer (1986)
provided insight into lie detection by comparing an undergraduate sample with a sample
of newly recruited federal law enforcement trainees and a sample of advanced law
enforcement officers. No differences emerged between the samples; those with more
“experience” at lie detection performed at the same rate as the undergraduate sample.
Also, they showed no indication that they would be more adept at developing lie
detection skills than the undergraduate sample. However, Elaad (2003) reported that
overall, law-enforcement officers, acting as judges, reported that they would be more
likely to accurately detect lies than would “non-experts.” In another comparison, Ekman
and O’Sullivan (1991) noted that those working for the Secret Service did outperform
other samples in detecting deception, but the rate of success was still quite low. The
Secret Service averaged 64% correct deception detection, while the next closest group,
federal polygraphers, averaged approximately 56%. Indeed, Sporer and Schwandt (2007)
noted that various groups (e.g., police officers, legal professionals, students) all held
similar (and possibly erroneous) assumptions about what nonverbal behaviors indicated
deception.
Overall, in their research on deception detection, Millar and Millar (1997)
observed that people believed deception was most likely when the deceiver would have a
high gain from the deception, the chance of detection was low, and the cost of deception
was low. Conversely, in situations in which the gain was low, but the chance of detection
and cost of deception were high, people were least likely to believe deception would
occur.
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Indicators of Deception
When detecting deception, people use different types of verbal and nonverbal cues to aid
them (Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991). As Frank (2005, p. 341) put it, “because a lie
involves a deliberate, conscious behavior, we can speculate that this effort may leave
some trace, sign, or signal that may betray that lie.” In his chapter, Frank (2005, p. 342343) identified a number of levels at which researchers have attempted to study
nonverbal behavior. He recognized physical components, which include body
movements (e.g., arms, hands, torso), eyeblinks, pupil dilation, number of pauses,
response latency, and so forth. Next, Frank discussed the psychologic meaning level,
which often involve the physical components listed above, but also include adaptors (e.g.,
touching one’s face), illustrators (“which accompany speech to help keep the rhythm of
the speech, emphasize a word, show direction of thought, etc.”), emblems (e.g., nodding
one’s head to indicate agreement), facial expression, speech rate and speech errors.
Additionally, Sporer and Schwandt (2007) identified two classes of nonverbal behavior:
nonverbal visual cues and paraverbal cues. According to the authors, nonverbal visual
cues encompass such things as facial expression and bodily movements, whereas
paraverbal cues include things such as pitch and speech errors.3
The following paragraphs describe common cues associated with deception. It
should be noted, however, that what people use as cues to deception do not necessarily
coincide with the actual behaviors which can accompany deception (e.g., The Global
Deception Research Team, 2006; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007). The descriptions given
below reflect examples of what people believe to be associated with deception. With the

3

I have adopted Sporer and Schwandt’s (2007) classification system to organize the following
subsections. However, when describing studies I will use the terms employed by the authors.

59
exception of certain body movements (i.e., nodding, foot and leg movement, hand/finger
movements), none of the “traditional deception cues” (e.g., eye contact) people employ
are reliable indicators of deception (Sporer & Schwandt, 2007).
Paraverbal Cues
One hypothesis is that when the speaker’s emotion runs high (e.g., in “high
stakes” situations), people should be more accurate at detecting deception (Ekman,
O’Sullivan, Friesen, & Scherer, 1991; Frank & Ekman, 1997). In an early study on lie
detection, Apple, Streeter, and Krauss (1979) reported that voice pitch can affect one’s
perceived honesty and persuasiveness; the higher the voice, the less honest and
persuasive the speaker is perceived to be. 4 The authors suggested that a high-pitched
voice indicated stress, leading many observers to conclude that the speaker was lying.
The authors also noted that, with “loaded questions,” people are somewhat more
forgiving of higher-pitched voices than when the question involves something more
mundane. In other words, high-pitched voices, overall, indicated deception; in the
presence of a “loaded question” “raters were willing to call both low- and normal-pitched
voices more truthful than high-pitched voices” (p. 720). On topics that are uninvolved,
however, people were only more willing to believe someone with a low-pitched voice.
Indeed, in its research, The Global Deception Research Team (2006), using data from 58
countries, reported that, cross-culturally, a speaker’s nervousness indicated deception.
Frank and Ekman (1997) took research on arousal one step further. Whereas
Apple and colleagues (1979) had participants listen to voice recordings, Frank and
Ekman (1997) had people visually observe speakers and determine whether the speakers
were engaged in deception. Participants in Frank and Ekman’s study, then, could use
4

These results are all based on ratings of men’s voices.
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different sources as a means of determining deception. While Frank and Ekman reported
that emotion plays a role in deception detection, their results indicated that judges relied
more on what the authors referred to as nonverbal behavior (e.g., facial expressions) to
diagnose more aroused liars. Judges judged liars who were not aroused based on verbal
behavior. The researchers considered motivated liars to be the most aroused. Therefore,
when judging an offender’s truthfulness, one can look to motivation and arousal as
indicators of whether one should pay attention to verbal or nonverbal cues. According to
Frank and Ekman, the “first step in the process is to recognize a sign, a clue, a behavior
that violates expectations, or an emotion displayed by a target person that is at odds with
his or her verbal line” (p. 1437). Observers need to view this cautiously, however. As
Petrucci (2002) noted, “offenders who genuinely apologize but who use a different
language style than the observer may be more likely to be seen as unconvincing” (p.
346). In other words, it does not necessarily indicate deception that one’s style violates
expectation.
Pace was an additional factor in determining truthfulness. Apple and colleagues
(1979; Hocking & Leathers, 1980) reported that slow- and fast-paced speech indicated
deceptiveness, while moderately-paced speech was most indicative of honesty.
Nonverbal Visual Cues
Worldwide, people cite gaze aversion as the most telltale sign that someone is
being untruthful (The Global Deception Research Team, 2006; see also Sporer &
Schwandt, 2007). Research (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007),
however, does not bear this out; eye contact (or lack thereof) is not a faithful indicator of
deception.
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Hocking and Leathers (1980) reported that deceivers should use “fewer gestural
cues such as foot movements, head movements, and illustrators” (p. 130). Sporer and
Schwandt (2007), in their meta-analysis of nonverbal indicators of deception, reported
fewer behaviors such as nodding, foot, leg, and hand movements when someone was
lying.
Verbal and Nonverbal Indicators of Deception
Unfortunately, no one factor seems to be present across all attempts at deception,
although some, on aggregate, can predict deception, particularly if the liar is motivated
(DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, 2003). As Frank (2005)
suggested, one possible reason for this is the failure of researchers to fully define what
their concepts are. He noted that often, inter-rater reliability is quite high as to what
constitutes a smile (above 0.90), but researchers never clearly establish what constitutes a
smile. Similarly, researchers have conceptualized things like ‘arousal’ quite differently,
which may be one reason results are sometimes anomalous.
Nonverbal cues, however, are no surefire way to detect deception. Instead, some
(e.g., Ekman et al., 1991) suggested that nonverbal cues such as facial expression should
encourage investigators to delve more deeply into a particular area of inquiry, rather than
to take such nonverbal cues as proof of deception. Indeed, Sporer and Schwandt’s (2007)
meta-analysis revealed that nodding, and foot, leg, and hand movements all decreased
with deception, which was counter to lay beliefs about cues to deception.
CHAPTER 6: Apologies and Deception: Bridging the Gap
As the previous sections illustrate, a great deal of literature focuses on apologies
and deception detection. The relationship between these two areas, however, is
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underdeveloped. One fundamental area of research concerns distinguishing between
believability and sincerity. While a majority of research focuses on the sincerity of the
apology, the concept of sincerity remains unclear. Similarly, the research examining
believability does little to clarify how participants define/understand this concept. A
potential explanation for this has to do with the procedure of the apology studies. They
all involve paper-and-pencil methods, which do not easily lend themselves to the study of
deception. For example, there are often no overt indications that an apologizer is
insincere or not believable in his delivery. Although researchers have manipulated
circumstances which might influence an apologizer’s motivation (e.g., a criminal
apologizing in court to receive a lighter sentence), participants have had to rely on written
descriptions to determine sincerity. Considering the verbal and nonverbal dynamics
involved with deception detection, it is not surprising that the relevant apology research
does not address this issue. One avenue ready for exploration, then, involves having
participants rate apologies based on live experiences rather than written vignettes.
Another beneficial avenue to explore involves the apologizer’s motivation for
offering the apology. Watching a criminal offer an apology in court, for example, might
lead to different attributions than simply reading about it. The interaction between what
the offender says and his/her body language and voice inflections could have interesting
implications. For example, even though research (e.g., Taylor & Kleinke, 1992) has
indicated that people view offenders who apologize more favorably, if one sees an
offender apologize in a purely perfunctory manner, the observer may be more skeptical of
the apology and judge the offender (and the proffered apology) more negatively than if
there was no apology.
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Finally, a variety of factors can influence one’s interpretation of another’s
nonverbal and verbal behavior. For example, one might be more critical and observant of
an apologizer’s nonverbal and verbal behavior when he has high motivation to apologize
(e.g., a criminal in court) as opposed to a low motivation (e.g., bumping into someone).
Cues indicating deception might be more apparent and influence subsequent
interpretations of one’s apology.
The study of apology is an important aspect of understanding relational dynamics
across a variety of settings. Apologies stand apart from other accounts such as excuses
and justifications in that they include accountability for conduct without any attempt at
mitigating the conduct’s outcome or at justifying one’s action. From everyday
transgressions to major crimes, apologies can have healing effects for victims as well as
offenders. These effects, however, are far from straightforward. Indeed, the evident
culpability of the actor, the timing of the apology and its completeness can all impact
how willing one is to accept it. Similarly, an offender’s motivation for offering an
apology can affect its perceived genuineness.
In terms of an apology’s authenticity, it is important to understand that people
offer apologies and accounts for a number of reasons. Mending relationships, saving
face, and receiving more lenient punishments are all reasons people might offer
apologies. Conversely, people resist apologizing in a number of situations in order to
avoid admitting culpability. In response to such concerns, a number of legal safeguards
are in place (to varying degrees) to protect transgressors and their statements.
Due to the effects apologies can have, however (e.g., reduced prison sentence), it
becomes important for victims and observers to determine when one is being forthcoming
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or deceptive. Research in this realm, however, is not terribly promising, as it reveals that
people are very fallible lie detectors overall.
CHAPTER 7: Current Research
I conducted a study examining the effects of verbal and non-verbal behavior on
perceptions of believability and sincerity. Although previous research has assessed
sincerity, none has gone beyond asking participants, “How sincere did the apologizer
seem?” without defining sincerity. Indeed, it appears that most research has used
sincerity and believability synonymously. It is an important issue to clarify, then, as the
two, although at times linked, can exist without each other. As mentioned above,
sincerity does not necessarily mean that one will be believed, and believing another’s
statement does not mean that statement was sincere. Given the implications an apology
can have, it is important to recognize what factors lend themselves to believability and
sincerity detection, especially with respect to nonverbal behavior (i.e., nonverbal visual
cues and paraverbal cues), relationship between the parties, and type of statement.
The research involved a medical malpractice case involving a misdiagnosis of
appendicitis. Participants read the facts of a medical malpractice case before watching a
videotaped statement from the physician-defendant. The videotaped statement allowed
participants to observe eye contact as well as variations in speech rate. This study is the
first to incorporate facets of nonverbal behavior in judging responses to transgressions.
Hypotheses
Nonverbal Behavior
As reviewed above, when assessing a speaker’s message, people rely on the
content of the communication, but they also rely on how the speaker relays the content.
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A speaker’s posture, mannerisms, and body language can all influence perceptions of a
message. One aspect of nonverbal behavior people routinely observe is eye contact. As
Sporer and Schwandt (2007, p. 1) noted, “around the world gaze aversion is deemed the
most important signal of deception.” Indeed, the Global Deception Research Team
(2006), in their survey of men and women from 58 countries around the world, including
western countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as eastern
countries such as Japan and China, found that “the most common belief about deception
worldwide is that liars avoid eye contact” (p. 65). These authors further noted that, when
lying about facts and feelings (as opposed to simply facts), liars made less eye contact.
The effects of eye contact on believability have implications for lie detection, in that
people believe liars make eye contact less frequently and hold a gaze for a shorter period
of time than do truthtellers, although research does not support this assumption (e.g.,
Sporer & Schwandt, 2007).
Another aspect of nonverbal behavior involves speech rate. The underlying
assumption is that liars are affected by adrenaline (presumably from fear of being caught
in a lie) and therefore speak at faster rates than usual (for a review see Sporer &
Schwandt, 2007). Similarly, Guerrero and Floyd (2006, p. 179) noted that “one’s vocal
pattern and fluency might be compromised by the increased anxiety and arousal that
often accompanies deception…” Further, in their review, Guerrero and Floyd cited
research indicating that a speaker’s increased nervousness heightened listeners’ suspicion
that the speaker might be attempting deception.
Speech rate also affects perceptions of relationships. Newton and Burgoon
(1990), for example, found that partners in relationships spoke more quickly in conflict
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situations. These “competing strategies” might indicate to observers tension and conflict
in a relationship, resulting in harsher judgments of a defendant. Sillars (1980), for
example, noted that partners use competing strategies when they blame their partner; in
the current study observers might infer the faster speech rate indicates guilt on the part of
the physician-defendant.
It is worth noting, however, that a more rapid speech rate can positively affect a
speaker’s credibility in certain situations. Miller, Maruyama, and Beaber (1976), for
example, reported that speakers who spoke more quickly were more persuasive. Buller
and Aune (1992) also reported positive effects for speech rate; the more the speaker’s
speech rate matched that of the participant, the more the participant liked the speaker and
the more the participant was willing to comply with the speaker’s request. These results,
however, do not directly address deception. Indeed, Miller and colleagues (1976, p. 621)
noted “in no way can we claim that our effects are entirely or purely attributable to speed
of speech.”
The effects of eye contact and speech rate (discussed above) led to my first two
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: I expected a main effect for eye contact. Specifically, the less direct eye
contact the defendant maintains, the lower the ratings for believability and (perceived)
sincerity. I also predicted less eye contact would lead to less positive perceptions of the
defendant as measured by how satisfied participants were with his statement, how
compassionate they felt him to be, and whether or not they agreed with the liability
judgment. Additionally, they will award higher compensatory damages when there is
less direct eye contact.
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Hypothesis 2: I expected a main effect for speech rate. Specifically, the more quickly
the defendant speaks, the less believable and sincere participants will rate his statement. I
also predicted that a faster speech rate would lead to less positive perceptions of the
defendant as measured by how satisfied participants were with his statement, how
compassionate they felt him to be, and whether or not they agreed with the liability
judgment. Additionally, they will award higher compensatory damages when the
plaintiff speaks more quickly.
Familiarity
Another manipulation included in this study involves the familiarity between the
parties. In the “familiar” condition George Thompson (the plaintiff) had visited Dr.
Johnson (the defendant) approximately eight times over five years for relatively minor
issues (e.g., colds and allergies). In the “unfamiliar” condition George Thompson and
Dr. Johnson had no prior relationship.
Itoi et al. (1996) reported that, when assuming the role of a transgressor,
American participants chose which type of account to offer based on concerns regarding
them as individuals, rather than concerns regarding their relationship with the victim,
regardless of whether the victim was known to them or not. In this research, however, I
expected an effect of relationship closeness. The reason for this lies in the relationship
which this study will establish: that between a doctor and patient (Thimsen, Bornstein, &
Robbennolt, 2007). Itoi and colleagues (1996) asked participants to imagine themselves
as transgressors in a variety of situations. To establish relationship closeness, the
researchers stated that the victim in each case was either a complete stranger to the
transgressor (i.e., participant) or was a close friend. In the present research, I used the
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doctor-patient relationship because it contains a type of trust different from that in
friendship. While it is not unrealistic to think doctors are friends with their patients, by
virtue of their profession they have explicit obligations to treat their patients (friends or
not) in a certain way. If they fail in this duty they may face ramifications (e.g., legal,
professional). Friendship, on the other hand, (typically) comes with no explicit
obligations; there are no standards of practice. While one may feel betrayed, hurt, let
down, and so forth, by a friend, it is unlikely the friend would face any legal or
professional ramifications for his actions. In terms of trust, it might be that people feel
more let down by doctors when the trust is violated because there are specific
expectations established for physicians’ behavior.
Hypothesis 3: I predicted a main effect for familiarity. Specifically, I predicted
participants would award lower compensatory damage awards when a previous
relationship existed than when the parties had no previous relationship. I also predicted
participants would rate the statement as less sincere and believable when no previous
relationship existed.
Trust Variables
In the current research, I also assessed participants’ levels of dispositional trust as
third parties; they are not directly involved in the harm. Examining participants’ levels of
trust is important for two main reasons. First, people vary in their general levels of trust,
which can affect responses to trust violations, those in which they are directly involved,
but also, possibly, trust violations they witness in other relationships. Second, looking at
relationships in terms of legal obligations might elicit different responses from
participants. Establishing a prior relationship between the two individuals adds a level of
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interpersonal trust, in addition to the general trust most people place in physicians. I
included three different measures of trust: the Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967),
Faith in People Scale (Rosenberg, 1957), and a subset of items from the International
Personality Item Pool (Goldberg, 1999).
Hypothesis 4: I hypothesized that participants scoring higher on trust would find the
plaintiff as less justified in suing the defendant.
Statement Type
Participants will view one of two statements. One includes an explicit apology
along with elements of excuse, while the other only includes the doctor’s excuse for his
behavior with no element of an apology (e.g., saying “I’m sorry” or acknowledging
wrongdoing). Exploring different statements from the doctor will add to the literature
examining the different effects of apologies and excuses.
Hypothesis 5: I predicted a main effect for statement type: participants will have more
positive perceptions of the defendant when he offers an apology than when he does not.
Additionally, participants will award less in compensatory damages when the defendant
apologizes. To assess perceptions I used three ratings: satisfaction with the defendant’s
explanation, how compassionate they believed the defendant to be, and whether they
agreed with the liability verdict. Additionally, I predicted that participants would award
less in compensatory damages when the defendant apologizes.
Interactions
In addition to main effects, I predicted some interactions among independent
variables.
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Hypothesis 6: I predicted an interaction between eye contact and statement type.
Previous research (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; The Global Deception Research Team,
2006; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007) has established that people use eye contact as an (albeit
faulty) cue of deception. Maintaining eye contact, then, might indicate to participants
that the doctor is being forthcoming with his apology. Similarly, by offering an apology,
participants might form a more positive view of the doctor. Taken together, these
conclusions led me to hypothesize that participants will have more positive perceptions of
Dr. Johnson when he maintains eye contact and apologizes than when he offers an excuse
only. To assess perceptions I used the same variables as in Hypothesis 5 (i.e.,
explanation satisfaction, perceived compassion, and agreement with verdict). I also
hypothesized that maintaining eye contact and an apology will result in the lowest
compensatory damage awards and maintaining eye contact and an excuse will result in
the highest compensatory damage awards. I also hypothesized that maintaining eye
contact without an apology will result in less positive perceptions of the defendant and
higher compensatory damage awards; participants might see an excuse with direct eye
contact as a sign of defiance rather than a sign of contrition.
Hypothesis 7: According to Kim et al. (2004), participants reported greater trust
reparation when a transgressor offered an apology for a competence-based trust violation.
I therefore predicted an interaction between statement type and familiarity. Specifically,
I hypothesized that compensatory damages will be lowest when the doctor apologizes and
a prior relationship exists between the parties. I expected the highest damage awards to
occur when the doctor offers an excuse and has a prior relationship with the plaintiff;
statement type will have less of an effect in the absence of a prior relationship.
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Relationship between Believability and Perceived Sincerity
As mentioned above, a number of studies have examined perceptions of
believability and sincerity, but have not gone beyond asking participants simple yes/no
questions or rating questions. Thus, in my research, questions regarding sincerity and
believability will be largely exploratory.
Hypothesis 8: I hypothesized that believability and sincerity ratings will positively
correlate with each other. Content analyses from open-ended questions revealed what
factors affected participants’ judgments of the believability and sincerity of the
defendant’s statement. Although I did not hypothesize differences between ratings of
sincerity and believability, analyses will be able to determine whether the independent
variables affect sincerity and believability differently.
CHAPTER 8: Method
Participants
Participants (N = 297) came from undergraduate classes at a large Midwestern
university. In exchange for participation, participants received course extra credit. A
total of 287 participants reported their ages, which ranged from 18 to 36 years of age.
The average age of the participants was 20.52 years (SD = 2.36) with more women (n =
203) than men (n = 86) participating. The majority of the participants identified as white
(n = 254) while the rest identified as black (n = 32), Asian (n = 4), or did not indicate
their race (n = 6). Eight participants did not indicate gender.
Design and Procedure
The study was a 2 (statement type: apology v. excuse) x 2 (familiarity: familiar
v. unfamiliar) x 2 (eye contact: steady v. shifty) x 2 (speech rate: normal v. rapid)
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between-groups design. Due to random assignment the cells were somewhat unbalanced,
with 13-26 participants per condition. The main dependent variables were compensatory
damage awards, ratings of sincerity, ratings of believability, and measures of participants’
trust tendencies.
Participants completed the study via Qualtrics, an online data-gathering source.
After reading and electronically signing an informed consent, participants read a brief
summary of facts regarding a misdiagnosis of appendicitis which resulted in serious
complications for the patient. The two parties involved were George Thompson (the
patient/plaintiff) and Michael Johnson (the physician/defendant). The summary involved
written statements from both George Thompson and Dr. Johnson (Appendix A).
Participants read instructions informing them that another jury has found Dr. Johnson
liable and that it is their responsibility to award damages (Appendix B). Before awarding
damages participants watched a videotaped statement from Dr. Johnson, in which he
offered either an apology (Appendix C) or an excuse for what happened (Appendix D).
The statement came after participants first read the facts of the case. The video was of
Dr. Johnson looking into the camera and lasted approximately one to two minutes in
length and contained the manipulations of eye contact and speech rate. In the rapid
speech rate condition Dr. Johnson spoke at an increased rate with no natural
stops/hesitations. In the normal speech rate condition Dr. Johnson spoke at a
conversational pace. In the shifty condition, Dr. Johnson alternately looked between the
camera and in a downward, sidelong direction. In the steady condition Dr. Johnson
maintained consistent eye contact with the camera. In the shifty condition Dr. Johnson
looked away when offering his initial statement. Because of the relationship between
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shifty eyes and deception, it was important to have the two coincide in the video (i.e.,
indicate possible deception with the manipulation).
Subsequent to watching the video, participants had the opportunity to award
compensatory damages (Appendix E). I chose to focus on compensatory damages as the
malpractice presented here is likely not reprehensible enough to warrant punitive
damages. Participants then answered questions designed to assess their perceptions of
various parts of the study (Appendix F), including perceptions of Dr. Johnson and George
Thompson. The questions asked participants to rate Dr. Johnson’s responsibility, how
satisfactory Dr. Johnson’s statement was, how justified George Thompson was in suing
Dr. Johnson. Each question was a Likert-type question, with responses ranging from one
to five. Two important questions asked participants to rate the sincerity and believability
of Dr. Johnson’s statements. Participants also answered open-ended questions designed
to get at their own definitions/understandings of what sincerity and believability mean in
this context.
Participants completed the Interpersonal Trust Scale (ITS; Rotter, 1967, 1971;
Appendix G), a 25-item measure designed to gauge one’s trust of a number of groups of
people, such as parents, teachers, and physicians. The ITS is an additive scale, with
higher scores indicating higher levels of trust. The reported split-half reliability is .76,
with test-retest reliability .56, and .68 across 7- and 3-month intervals, respectively
(Rotter, 1967, 1971).
Next, participants completed the Faith in People Scale (FPS; Rosenberg, 1957;
Appendix H). This 5-item scale is meant to assess one’s overall faith in other people by
giving participants forced-choice answer options to statements regarding others’
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trustworthiness and concern for others. This scale has a coefficient of reproducibility of
.92 (Rosenberg, 1957).
The last measure for participants assessed dispositional trust with items taken
from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP, Goldberg, 1999; Appendix I).
Finally, participants completed a demographic questionnaire (Appendix J). The
entire process took approximately 15-20 minutes. After completing the demographic
form, participants received a debriefing statement and were thanked for their
participation.
Pilot Testing
Before data collection, in order to ensure my manipulations were sufficiently
strong I pilot tested the vignette and video statements. After reading the vignette and
watching the video I asked participants (N = 80) questions relating to the manipulations
only. Results indicated that participants were receptive to the manipulations.
To assess whether participants were receptive to the familiarity manipulation I
asked participants, “Had George Thompson ever visited Dr. Johnson before the visit
which resulted in the lawsuit?” Participants responded to a forced-choice Yes/No option.
Of the 45 participants in the familiar condition, 40 correctly identified George Thompson
and Dr. Johnson as having a previous relationship. Of the 35 participants in the
unfamiliar condition, 28 correctly identified George Thompson and Dr. Johnson as
having no previous relationship. Results from a Chi-square analysis revealed a
significant effect, χ² (1) = 21.39, p < .01.
To assess whether participants perceived Dr. Johnson apologizing or not I asked
participants, “Did Dr. Johnson say ‘I’m sorry’ at any point when he was making his
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statement?” Participants responded to a forced-choice Yes/No option. Of the 39
participants in the apology condition, 37 correctly indicated Dr. Johnson had said “I’m
sorry.” Of the 40 participants in the excuse condition 34 correctly indicated Dr. Johnson
had not said “I’m sorry.” Results from a Chi-square analysis showed a significant effect,
χ² (1) = 10.22, p < .01.
To assess the effect of eye contact I asked participants to rate how steadily Dr.
Johnson maintained eye contact during his statement. Participants rated eye contact on a
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“completely”). The average rating
was 2.85 (SD = 1.49). Results from a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a
significant effect of eye contact (F (1, 78) = 45.64, p < .01). The average rating in the
shifty condition was 1.98 (SD = 1.19) and was 3.77 (SD = 1.18).
To assess the effect of the speech rate I asked participants to rate how quickly Dr.
Johnson spoke. Participants rated speech rate on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1
(“very slowly”) to 5 (“very quickly”). The average rating was 3.05 (SD = 1.08). Results
from a one-way ANOVA showed a significant effect for speech rate (F (1, 78) = 57.66, p
< .01). The average rating in the normal condition was 2.32 (SD = .66) and 3.71 (SD =
.94) in the rapid condition.
CHAPTER 9: Results
Manipulation Checks
I conducted analyses to determine if the participants in the main study responded
to the manipulation checks. I employed the same analysis techniques as in Pilot Testing
and used the same questions as indications of responsivity to the manipulations.

76
As with pilot testing, the manipulations were having an effect. Results indicated
that familiarity did have an effect (χ² (1) = 84.77, p < .001) as did statement type (χ² (1) =
53.65, p < .001).
Sincerity
To assess main effects and interactions of the independent variables on ratings of
believability I conducted a four-way ANOVA with statement type, eye contact, speech
rate and familiarity as the independent variables and sincerity as the dependent variable.
Participants offered ratings of sincerity on a Likert-type scale which ranged from 1 (“not
at all sincere”) to 5 (“completely sincere”). The effect size for the corrected model was
.20 (r = .11). The average sincerity rating was 3.79 (SD = 1.00). No significant main
effects emerged, although each condition (save familiarity) was trending toward
significance. The only significant interaction to emerge was between statement type and
speech rate with participants in the apology, normal condition rating the statement as
more sincere (M = 4.15) as more sincere than participants in the apology, rapid condition
(M = 3.71) or either of the excuse conditions (normal, M = 3.68, rapid, M = 3.73). Table
1 provides the F statistics and significance values for this analysis.
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Table 9.1
ANOVA Statistics for Ratings of Sincerity
Main Effects and
Interactions

F

p

η²

Statement Type

3.52

.06

.01

Eye Contact

2.58

.11

.01

Speech Rate

2.65

.11

.01

Familiarity

.00

.99

.00

Statement Type * Eye
Contact

.10

.76

.00

Statement Type * Speech
Rate

4.41

.04

.02

Statement Type *
Familiarity

.29

.59

.00

Eye Contact * Speech
Rate

1.21

.27

.00

Eye Contact *
Familiarity

.23

.63

.00

Speech Rate *
Familiarity

1.70

.19

.01

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Speech Rate

2.55

.11

.01

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Familiarity

.95

.33

.00

Statement Type * Speech
Rate * Familiarity

.00

.98

.00

Eye Contact * Speech
Rate * Familiarity

.04

.85

.00

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Speech Rate *
Familiarity

.14

.71

.00
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Although not significant, the main effect for apology was approaching
significance with participants in the apology condition rating the statement as more
sincere (M = 3.93) than participants in the excuse condition (M = 3.70). Similarly, main
effects were trending toward significance for both eye contact and speech rate. Analyses
show sincerity ratings being higher when eye contact was steady (M = 3.91) rather than
shifty (M = 3.72) and when the speech rate was normal (M = 3.91) rather than when it
was rapid (M = 3.72), although these differences are not statistically significant.
Content Analyses
After rating how sincere they believed Dr. Johnson’s statement to be, participants
had the opportunity to answer an open-ended question meant to assess what made the
statement (not) sincere. The most common responses here dealt with the defendant’s
tone of voice and also the type of statement he provided. Participants often directly
mentioned tone of voice when describing the defendant’s sincerity (e.g., “His tone of
voice made him sound sincere”). Participants also directly mentioned his apology (e.g.,
“He offered an apology for what happened”). Other categories included
professionalism/competence, rate of speech, eye contact, and overall demeanor (e.g.,
body language, facial expressions). Table 2 provides a breakdown of the major
categories created and the number of responses included in each category, as well as
typical examples of answers for each category. Table 3 provides the Chi-square statistics
for the relationship between the independent variables and the categories of believability.
A significant relationship did emerge for eye contact; more people in the shifty condition
mentioned eye contact than did participants in the steady condition. Also, although not
significant, the relationship with statement type was approaching significance;
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participants in the apology condition made reference to the statement more than did
participants in the excuse condition.
Table 9.2
Categories of Sincerity Content Analysis
Category
Professionalism/Competence

Response Count
20

Tone of Voice

37

Rate of Speech
Eye Contact

3
36

Statement Effect

22

Overall Demeanor

33

Example
“I felt that Dr. Johnson
made it clear that he looks
out for the health and wellbeing of each and every
one of his patients.”
“He kept mentioned [sic]
how he tries to help any
patient no matter who they
are.”
“He had a very calming
voice…”
“His tone of voice seemed
very sincere.”
“…talked slowly…”
“He did not look into the
camera…”
“He had trouble looking
into the camera.”
“…he reiterated his
apology multiple times…”
“…apologizing to his
patient...”
“…his facial expressions
seemed sincere.”
“he showed shameful facial
expressions”
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Table 9.3
Chi-square Statistics for Independent Variables and Sincerity Content Categories
Manipulation

χ²

p

Statement Type

10.20

.07

Eye Contact

15.59

.02

Speech Rate

8.56

.20

Familiarity

6.34

.39

Believability
To assess main effects and interactions of the independent variables on ratings of
believability I conducted a four-way ANOVA with statement type, eye contact, speech
rate and familiarity as the independent variables and believability as the dependent
variable. Participants offered ratings of believability on a Likert-type scale which ranged
from 1 (“not at all believable”) to 5 (“completely believable”). The average believability
rating was 3.71 (SD = .94). No significant main effects emerged, although a significant
statement type by speech rate interaction did emerge with participants in the apology,
normal speech rate condition rating the statement as more believable (M = 4.02) than
participants in the apology, rapid condition (M = 3.59), or either of the excuse conditions
(normal, M = 3.60, rapid, M = 3.67). The statement type X eye contact X speech rate
interaction was approaching significance. Table 4 provides the F statistics and
significance values for this analysis.
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Table 9.4
ANOVA Statistics for Ratings of Believability
Main Effects and
Interactions

F

p

η²

Statement Type

2.20

.14

.01

Eye Contact

.05

.82

.00

Speech Rate

2.42

.12

.01

Familiarity

.41

.53

.00

Statement Type * Eye
Contact

.33

.56

.00

Statement Type * Speech
Rate

4.89

.03

.02

Statement Type *
Familiarity

.13

.72

.00

Eye Contact * Speech
Rate

.28

.60

.00

Eye Contact *
Familiarity

.25

.62

.00

Speech Rate *
Familiarity

.58

.45

.00

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Speech Rate

3.23

.07

.01

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Familiarity

2.20

.14

.01

Statement Type * Speech
Rate * Familiarity

.05

.82

.00

Eye Contact * Speech
Rate * Familiarity

1.32

.25

.00

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Speech Rate *
Familiarity

.00

.98

.00
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Content Analyses
After rating how believable they believed Dr. Johnson’s statement to be,
participants had the opportunity to answer an open-ended question meant to assess what
made the statement (not) believable. As with sincerity, I was looking to see if reasons
given differed as a function of the independent variables. The most common responses
here related to Dr. Johnson’s professionalism/competence. Typical responses coded here
include things such as, “I don’t think that a doctor would give the wrong diagnosis on
purpose” and “I believe Dr. Johnson was doing all the tests he needed to do with the
information from George Thompson he was given.” Table 5 provides a breakdown of
responses and categories. Table 6 provides the Chi-square statistics for analyses
assessing the relationship between the believability categories and the independent
variables. No significant relationships emerged between the believability categories and
statement type, speech rate, or familiarity. A significant relationship did emerge between
eye contact and believability categories. Those in the shifty condition mentioned eye
contact significantly more than did those in the steady condition.
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Table 9.5
Categories of Believability Content Analysis
Category
Professionalism/Competence

Response Count
62

Tone of Voice

19

Rate of Speech

5

Eye Contact

23

Statement Effect

21

Overall Demeanor

40

Example
“He talked about how he
did not want to put the
patient through any
unecessary [sic] test.”
“It was believable because
he made it seem like he
really did think George just
had the flu and the
symptoms were the same
as the flu.”
“His tone of voice…”
“…a serious apologetic
tone”
“He didn’t rush through
it.”
“There was little to no
hesitation in his voice.”
“He couldn’t look at the
video camera…”
“I think it was not
believable because he didnt
[sic] make eye contact very
often…”
“It wasn’t believable due
to the fact that he could’t
[sic] look into the camera
and talk.”
“…he apologized a couple
times”
“He seemed to completely
sincere [sic] and said he
was ‘truly sorry’.”
“His body language is
sincere.”
“His facial expressions
looked sorry.”
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Table 9.6
Chi-square Statistics for Independent Variables and Believability Content Categories
Manipulation

χ²

p

Statement Type

1.56

.96

Eye Contact

14.22

.03

Speech Rate

3.18

.40

Familiarity

1.23

.98

Compensatory Damages
I asked participants to assess compensatory damages if they felt the plaintiff
deserved recompense. Only 159 participants provided actual numerical damage awards,
which ranged from $0 to $400,000 (M = $31506.30, SD = $48693.04). Of the
participants who did not enter a value numerically, 68 mentioned they would award
damages on par with the amount of money the plaintiff lost due to missing work and his
future medical expenses. Therefore, I conducted analyses only with the 159 data points
containing actual numbers.
Results from a four-way ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or
interactions. Table 7 provides the F statistics and significance values for this analysis.
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Table 9.7
ANOVA Statistics for Compensatory Damages
Main Effects and
Interactions

F

p

η²

Statement Type

2.14

.15

.01

Eye Contact

2.51

.12

.02

Speech Rate

.00

.99

.00

Familiarity

.41

.52

.00

Statement Type * Eye
Contact

.59

.44

.00

Statement Type * Speech
Rate

.16

.69

.00

Statement Type *
Familiarity

.09

.76

.00

Eye Contact * Speech
Rate

2.42

.12

.02

Eye Contact *
Familiarity

.30

.59

.00

Speech Rate *
Familiarity

1.95

.17

.01

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Speech Rate

.89

.35

.01

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Familiarity

1.93

.17

.01

Statement Type * Speech
Rate * Familiarity

.72

.40

.00

Eye Contact * Speech
Rate * Familiarity

.07

.79

.00

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Speech Rate *
Familiarity

.22

.64

.00
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Perceptions of Defendant
I used three different ratings to assess participants’ perceptions of the defendant:
explanation satisfaction, compassion, and agreement with the liability judgment. I
predicted main effects for eye contact and speech rate. I hypothesized that less eye
contact and a faster speech rate would result in less positive perceptions of the defendant.
I also hypothesized a main effect for statement type. Specifically I predicted more
positive perceptions of the defendant when he apologized instead of offering an excuse.
Explanation Satisfaction
Participants rated how satisfactorily they felt the defendant’s statement explained
the circumstances of the case. Ratings fell on a Likert-type scale which ranged from 1
(“not at all satisfactory”) to 5 (“completely satisfactory”). Average satisfactory ratings
were 3.55 (SD = .97).
I conducted a four-way between-groups ANOVA using explanation satisfaction
as the dependent variable. Table 8 provides the F statistics and significance values for
this analysis.
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Table 9.8
ANOVA Statistics for Ratings of Explanation Satisfaction
Main Effects and
Interactions

F

p

η²

Statement Type

3.18

.01

.02

Eye Contact

.63

.43

.00

Speech Rate

1.61

.21

.00

Familiarity

.56

.46

.00

Statement Type * Eye
Contact

1.31

.25

.00

Statement Type * Speech
Rate

.84

.36

.00

Statement Type *
Familiarity

.65

.42

.00

Eye Contact * Speech
Rate

.14

.71

.00

Eye Contact *
Familiarity

.01

.92

.00

Speech Rate *
Familiarity

4.88

.03

.02

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Speech Rate

.53

.47

.00

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Familiarity

.61

.44

.00

Statement Type * Speech
Rate * Familiarity

1.06

.30

Eye Contact * Speech
Rate * Familiarity

3.11

.08

.01

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Speech Rate *
Familiarity

.05

.82

.00
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Results from a four-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for statement
type. Participants in the apology condition rated the explanation as more satisfactory (M
= 3.69) than did participants in the excuse condition (M = 3.40). A significant interaction
emerged between speech rate and familiarity, with participants in the normal speech rate,
unfamiliar condition rating the explanation as more satisfactory (M = 3.70) than
participants in the normal, familiar (M = 3.54), rapid, unfamiliar (M = 3.30), and rapid,
familiar (M = 3.64) conditions.
Compassion
A second analysis of perception came from impressions of the defendant’s
compassion. Specifically, participants rated “In your opinion, how compassionate is Dr.
Johnson?” on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (“not at all compassionate”) to 5
(“extremely compassionate”). The average rating was 3.42 (SD = .95).
I conducted a four-way between-groups ANOVA using compassion as the
dependent variable. Table 9 provides the F statistics and significance values for this
analysis.
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Table 9.9
ANOVA Statistics for Ratings of Defendant’s Compassion
Main Effects and
Interactions

F

p

η²

Statement Type

7.55

.01

.03

Eye Contact

.01

.94

.00

Speech Rate

1.53

.22

.01

Familiarity

.36

.55

.00

Statement Type * Eye
Contact
Statement Type * Speech
Rate

.65

.42

.00

3.28

.07

.01

Statement Type *
Familiarity

.04

.84

.00

Eye Contact * Speech
Rate

.24

.62

.00

Eye Contact *
Familiarity

.11

.74

.00

Speech Rate *
Familiarity

.27

.60

.00

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Speech Rate

2.66

.10

.01

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Familiarity

.06

.81

.00

Statement Type * Speech
Rate * Familiarity

.40

.53

.00

Eye Contact * Speech
Rate * Familiarity

2.51

.12

.01

Statement Type * Eye
Contact * Speech Rate *
Familiarity

1.80

.81

.01
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A main effect emerged for statement type, with participants in the apology
condition rating Dr. Johnson as more compassionate (M = 3.57) than participants in the
excuse condition (M = 3.26).
The interaction between statement type and speech rate was approaching
significance. Participants in the apology, normal speech rate condition rated Dr. Johnson
as more compassionate (M = 3.75) than in the apology, rapid (M = 3.40), excuse, normal
(M = 3.23), and excuse, rapid (M = 3.30) conditions.
Because ratings of compassion and explanation satisfaction were highly
correlated (r = .52, p < .001) I conducted a multivariate analysis of covariance
(MANCOVA) using compassion and explanation satisfaction as dependent variables. To
control for dispositional trust, ITS was entered as a covariate. No significant effect for
the covariate emerged (F (2, 229) = 2.25, p = .11). Analyses revealed a significant main
effect for statement type (F (2, 229) = 3.38, p = .04). Follow-up ANCOVAs revealed
significant differences between apologies and excuses for both compassion ratings (F (1,
230) = 5.61, p = .02) and explanation satisfaction (F (1, 230) = 4.42, p = .04). This is
identical to the patterns reported above.
Agreement with Verdict
As a proxy for perceptions of the defendant’s responsibility I asked the
categorical question of whether they agreed with the verdict that Dr. Johnson was liable.
Ten participants did not respond, but the majority of participants (n = 194) did agree with
the verdict. Ninety-three participants did not agree with the verdict. Results from
Pearson’s Chi-square analyses revealed no significant relationships between any of the
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independent variables and agreement with liability. Table 10 provides the Chi-square
statistics and significance values for the analyses.
Table 9.10
Chi-square Statistics for Agreement with Verdict
Manipulation

χ²

p

η²

Statement Type

2.11

.15

.00

Eye Contact

.00

.99

.00

Speech Rate

.18

.68

.01

Familiarity

.24

.63

.03

Correlational Analyses
Believability and Sincerity
I conducted a correlation on believability and sincerity ratings. Results showed a
significant positive correlation between believability and sincerity (r = .73, p = .00).
Because believability and sincerity were highly correlated, I conducted a 4-way
MANCOVA with sincerity and believability ratings as the dependent variables. To
control for dispositional trust ITS was entered as a covariate. No significant covariate
effect emerged (F (2, 230) = 1.34, p = .27). Results from the MANCOVA indicated no
significant main effects or interactions, although the apology x speech rate interaction
was approaching significance (F (2, 230) = 2.65, p = .07). Follow-up ANCOVAs
showed a significant interaction between apology and speech rate, for both sincerity (F
(1, 231) = 4.32, p = .04) and believability (F (1, 231) = 4.89, p = .03). This pattern was
identical to those reported in the individual ANOVAs above.
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Interpersonal Trust
I hypothesized that a higher score on the Interpersonal Trust Scale (ITS; Rotter,
1967) would negatively correlate with perceived justification in suing the defendant.
Participants rated their agreement to 25 items on the ITS with a 5-point rating scale
ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). A total score indicates the
participant’s trust score. The average ITS score was 66.10 (SD = 5.13, α = .41).
Although the alpha is quite low, the ITS is an established measure so I proceeded with
analysis using the scores from this study.
Participants also determined the justification for the plaintiff bringing the suit
against the doctor. Participants provided their answers on a Likert-type scale which
ranged from 1 (not at all justified) to 5 (completely justified). The average response to
the question was 3.29 (SD = .95).
A bivariate correlation between ITS score and justification rating revealed no
significant relationship (r (1, 253) = .08, p = .22). This did not support the hypothesis
that ITS scores and justification ratings would negatively correlate.
Faith in People
In addition to the ITS participants completed Rosenberg’s (1957) Faith in People
Scale (FPS). Participants responded to forced-choice options to a series of five questions
or statements. To establish a participants’ score I summed their responses to create a
total score. For answers reflecting faith in other people (e.g., agreeing with the statement,
“Human nature is fundamentally cooperative”) participants received a score of two
whereas disagreeing with such a statement would result in a score of one. Therefore
higher scores reflected greater faith in people. I reverse coded questions three and four,
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respectively. The average score on the FPS was 7.23 (SD = 1.42, α = .61). A bivariate
correlation between FPS score and justification rating revealed no significant relationship
(r (1, 287), = -.07, p = .26).
International Personality Item Pool
Finally, participants completed a subset of items from the International
Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg, 1999). Participants rated statements pertaining to
themselves on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (“very inaccurate”) to 5 (“very
accurate”). The average score on the IPIP was 3.41 (SD = .41, α = .42). Although the
alpha is quite low, the IPIP is an established measure so I proceeded with analysis using
the scores from this study. As with the ITS and FPS, I conducted a correlation between
IPIP scores and justification for bringing the lawsuit. A bivariate correlation between
IPIP and justification rating revealed no significant correlation between IPIP scores and
justification ratings (r (1, 287) = .07, p = .27).
CHAPTER 10: Discussion
The results of the current research add to the body of literature surrounding
apologies. Although not statistically significant, the research presented here indicated
that an apology can affect how sincerely people view it. An apology did have a
significant effect on how participants viewed the defendant. Overall apologies resulted in
greater satisfaction with the defendant’s statement and greater attribution of compassion
to the defendant than did excuses. When interacting with how quickly one speaks the
results become significant for offering an apology: Participants rated statements as more
sincere and more believable when an apology was offered and when the defendant spoke
at a normal, rather than a rapid, pace.
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The current research sought to more fully explore factors affecting perceptions of
apologies. As noted previously, apologies play an important role in everyday life and can
have far-reaching implications. One area in which apologies can play a vital role is in the
medical setting. Doctors are often advised not to make any apology to their patients due
to the fear that it might lead to negative outcomes (e.g., lawsuits) for the physician. A
growing body of literature is indicating, however, that apologies can have healing effects
in such contexts. A better understanding of factors affecting an observer’s perception of
an apology can have implications for how people respond to transgressions in the future.
Sincerity
One way to measure a statement’s effectiveness is to assess how sincerely people
perceive the speaker to be. In instances of public apologies, people are often skeptical of
the transgressor’s motivation and may be less inclined to perceive the apology as
accurately reflecting the transgressor’s true feelings. In the current research I
manipulated certain variables I felt would affect perceptions of a transgressor’s sincerity.
Although no significant main effects emerged for the independent variables, they did
trend toward significance. (The exception was the familiarity manipulation, which was
nowhere near significance.) Additionally, a significant interaction emerged between
statement type and speech rate; participants who viewed the apology spoken at a normal
rate judged the statement to be most sincere. These trends suggest that what statement is
offered, as well as the manner in which it is offered, can leave an impression on an
observer. Indeed, analyses of open-ended responses indicated that the speaker’s eye
contact, body language, and tone all affected how sincere participants believed him to be.
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Believability
Another measurement in the current research dealt with how believable
participants rated the statements they viewed. As expected, ratings of believability and
sincerity were very highly correlated and previous research has done little to distinguish
between these two concepts. As noted in the introduction, however, believability and
sincerity, though related, do not refer to the same concept. One goal of this research,
then, was to try and differentiate these concepts more clearly.
Results of various analyses indicated no significant main effects for the
independent variables. As with sincerity, though, a significant interaction did emerge
between speech rate and statement type; participants who viewed the apology spoken at a
normal rate judged it to be more believable than in other conditions. Analyses of openended answers to the question of what made the statement believable were largely similar
to the answers to the question regarding sincerity. Most participants noted things such as
body language, tone of voice, and eye contact as factors affecting the believability of the
statement.
Compensatory Damages
No significant main effects or interactions emerged for the dependent variable of
compensatory damages. A possible explanation for this could relate to the limited data (n
= 159) available for analysis.
Perceptions of the Defendant
In terms of overall feeling about the defendant I asked participants to rate some
proxy variables: explanation satisfaction, the defendant’s level of compassion, and
agreement with the verdict. In terms of explanation satisfaction, a significant main effect

96
emerged for statement type; participants who viewed the apology rated the statement as
more satisfactory than participants who viewed the excuse. A significant interaction
emerged between speech rate and familiarity; a normal speech rate and no familiarity
between the plaintiff and defendant resulted in more satisfaction with the explanation
provided.
As with explanation satisfaction, a main effect emerged for statement type when
rating how compassionate the defendant was; participants who viewed the apology rated
him as more compassionate. Although not significant, the interaction between speech
rate and statement type was on trend, with participants viewing the apology spoken at a
normal rate judging Dr. Johnson as being more compassionate.
Finally, a majority of participants agreed with the liability judgment, regardless of
what condition they were in.
Trust Measures
A final dependent variable in this study related to participants’ levels of trust.
Participants completed a number of trust scales and results from correlational analyses
indicated no significant correlations between trust scores and justification ratings.
Overall, no significant relationship emerged between trust and ratings of the plaintiff’s
justification for bringing a lawsuit.
Limitations
Although promising results did emerge, some limitations did arise.
One limitation in this study involved the medium through which participants
viewed the statement. In an actual case observers would observe the defendant making a
statement in person rather than on a video. Indeed, some answers in the content analyses
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indicated suspicion that the person in the video was an actor rather than an actual
defendant. Although I manipulated factors relevant to this study, observing a person live
rather than recorded allows observers to take other factors into account. Also, as this was
related to a court case, participants might have expected to see the statement in a
courtroom context.
Another limitation of this study involved the participant pool. Although previous
research (e.g., Bornstein, 1999) has shown that student populations do not significantly
differ from general populations in mock jury studies, a possibility still exists that an older
population might have viewed this study differently. Older populations, for example,
might have more experience with the medical system in terms of having more doctor
visits and facing more serious health issues. Further, older populations might be more in
tune with George Thompson’s problems of missing work and requiring follow-up
medical care, which could possibly affect their perceptions of the case.
The sample in this study was racially homogenous. A more diverse sample could
have led to different effects. Research (e.g., Williams, Burns, & Harmon, 2009) has
shown that one’s culture can affect one’s response to eye contact. In Western cultures,
for example, eye contact is encouraged, while Hispanic and Native American cultures
view eye contact as disrespectful. A more diverse sample might provide insight into how
different cultures perceive (a lack of) eye contact on the defendant’s part.
A larger number of participants could affect some of the results reported here. A
number of findings were near significance. A larger number of participants might help
make these marginally significant findings significant.
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In terms of the manipulations, although pilot testing indicated participants did
respond to the manipulations, changing them could have more of an effect. For example,
no main effects emerged for eye contact. One reason for this could be how eye contact
was manipulated. In the shifty condition, the gaze aversion might have lasted too long,
making it seem as if the defendant were reading a prepared statement rather than being
(potentially) dishonest. Based on open-ended answers provided, a number of participants
did note that they believed Dr. Johnson was simply reading a statement, which may or
may not indicate some form of deception or dishonesty. Future work might benefit from
having the speaker’s eye contact be more erratic than what it was here.
Another potential limitation was not having participants make liability judgments.
In the current research participants learned the defendant was liable before watching his
statement. A more conventional approach would be to have the participants determine
liability and then proceed through the rest of the study. Establishing liability for
participants might have signaled to them the defendant was only making a statement to
save his own skin or because his attorney advised him to do so. Some of the open-ended
answers did indicate this line of thinking, with participants noting “He’s only doing this
because his lawyer told him to” or “He just wants to look good.”
Implications
Although there are limitations in this study, the results do have some implications.
Consistent with previous research, results here indicated that apologizing can have
positive implications for the transgressor. Although no significant main effects emerged
on sincerity or believability, overall perceptions of the defendant were better when he
offered an apology than when he did not. Specifically, participants rated the defendant as
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more compassionate and were more satisfied with his explanation of the situation when
he explicitly said “I’m sorry.” The fact that participants viewed the doctor more
favorably after he apologized can lend itself to potential policy changes in intersecting
medical and legal communities. Instead of being afraid to apologize, physicians might
help their cases (and themselves) by offering an apology. This is in line with previous
research (e.g., Robbennolt, 2003; Vincent & Young, 1994) indicating people are more
willing to settle or even avoid litigation in the face of an apology from the offending
party.
Future Directions
More research needs to be done in the area of apologies to start to develop a
picture of all that can affect the (lack of) effectiveness of apologies and excuses (as well
as other types of accounts). With the current research I examined only a few of the many
factors affecting perceptions of apologies. Variables such as injury severity (e.g.,
Schlenker & Darby, 1981; Taylor & Kleinke, 1992), the timing of the apology (e.g.,
Bornstein et al., 2002; Kremer & Stephens, 1983; Lazare, 2006), and motivation for
making the statement (e.g., Risen & Gilovich, 2007) can all impact perceptions of
apologies.
Changing the manipulations to exploit these variables could be helpful (e.g.,
making liability judgments, viewing the statement before and after making a liability
judgment).
Conclusions
Recently, conservative radio talk-show host Rush Limbaugh referred to
Georgetown Law student Sandra Fluke as a “slut.” Limbaugh’s comment came after
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Fluke testified before Congress regarding a proposed mandate requiring health insurance
to cover birth control. In her testimony, Fluke noted she was in favor of such a mandate,
a stance with which Limbaugh took issue. Limbaugh went on to comment that Fluke
wanted the American public essentially to pay for her to have sex by providing insurance
coverage for her birth control pills. As it turned out, Limbaugh’s message did not sit well
with a number of people, including several of his advertisers. Days after his commentary
regarding Fluke, Limbaugh offered a public apology, noting that “he was ‘sincerely’
sorry about his ‘insulting’ characterization of Fluke” (Hart & Mirkinson, 2012). Sandra
Fluke subsequently refused his apology, stating that she believed Limbaugh only offered
the apology due to pressure from his show’s sponsors (Lavender, 2012).
The recent episode between Rush Limbaugh and Sandra Fluke served to illustrate
what people expect when a transgression has occurred. Although this happened on a
national stage, transgressions are a part of daily life and social norms dictate how those
involved with transgressions must deal with them. Between the person(s) who erred and
the person(s) harmed by the error, a dynamic relationship exists, one requiring proper
responses from the respective parties when a transgression has occurred.
A common approach to rectifying the injury caused via a transgression is to offer
an apology. As noted previously, apologies consist of “admissions of blameworthiness
and regret by the actor” (Schlenker & Darby, 1982, p. 271). Although often healing,
apologies can have some unintended consequences for the apologizer, however. One
concern for the actor is how others will view him once he has offered an apology. If one
apologizes then one has, by Schlenker and Darby’s definition, taken the responsibility for
the transgression and its outcome. Some people fear that this acceptance of responsibility
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will lower others’ opinions of them. Another concern is the potential for negative
consequences of apologizing. By admitting blameworthiness some people might fear
they are opening themselves up to more punishment than if they downplay or deny their
involvement with the transgression.
As mentioned above, Sandra Fluke did not accept the apology offered by Rush
Limbaugh. In the realm of public apologies, people often remain reluctant to accept the
verbal olive branch. Why might this be? While observers might rush to point out that
Limbaugh (probably) only apologized due to outside pressure rather than genuine
remorse for his actions, research shows that observers judged victims more negatively
when they rejected an offender’s apology, even if the apology is seen as insincere (Risen
& Gilovich, 2007; see also Bennett & Dewberry, 1994). Therefore, even if one is
disinclined to accept an apology, norms dictate that she is better off accepting the
apology than rejecting it.
The research conducted by Risen and Gilovich (2007) raised an interesting point:
What might make an apology seem sincere? No doubt everyone has at one time offered
(and just as likely been the recipient of) an apology with at least a (slight) lack of
sincerity. What differentiates a sincere apology from an insincere apology? Does
perceived sincerity affect how believable an observer believes the apology to be? The
research presented here sought to explore various factors which might affect the sincerity
and believability of an apology.
One area in which apologies can play a vital role is medical malpractice.
Unfortunately, medical errors occur daily. These errors might be relatively minor or they
might have serious, far-reaching consequences. In response to making an error, a number

102
of physicians indicated a desire to offer an apology to the patient (or patient’s family,
where appropriate; e.g., Gallagher et al., 2003). An interesting disconnect seems to be
taking place, however, because a number of medical practitioners are often told not to
offer an apology as it could be used at a later time as an admission of guilt. To this end, a
number of states have established at least some legal protections for apologies or
statements of remorse (see McDonnell & Guenther, 2008). Patients, however, often
desire an apology, and some have indicated an apology would have made them more
likely to settle malpractice claims (e.g., Robbennolt, 2003) or not follow through with
legal action at all (e.g., Vincent & Young, 1994). A medical malpractice case, then,
offered an interesting avenue to study apologies.
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Appendix A: Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s Statements
In January 2009, Dr. Michael Johnson stood trial for medical malpractice. The suit,
brought by George Thompson, a former patient of Dr. Johnson’s, alleged that Dr.
Johnson misdiagnosed his appendicitis, leading to severe and ongoing complications.
Below are statements from Dr. Johnson and George Thompson.
Statement of George Thompson:
I went to Dr. Johnson on Tuesday, November 3, 2009. [That was my first visit to Dr.
Johnson, since, I don’t have a regular physician and a colleague of mine
recommended Dr. Johnson.] [Dr. Johnson has been my regular physician for the
past five years. Over that time, I have probably consulted Dr. Johnson three times.]
For a few days prior to seeing Dr. Johnson I had some abdominal cramping, nausea, and
a slight fever. After the symptoms persisted, I went to Dr. Johnson who informed me I
had the stomach flu. He suggested I get more rest, eat bland food, and try to stay
hydrated. I followed his advice, but after a few days I still did not feel any better. I made
another appointment and again Dr. Johnson informed me I had a severe case of stomach
flu and gave me the same instructions as before. I took his advice and began feeling
better for a day or two. On the second night, however, I woke up with a terrible fever and
an intense pain in my side. I could barely move, but managed to make it to my phone
and call for an ambulance. The paramedics arrived and took me to the hospital where I
underwent an emergency appendectomy. After waking up I spoke with the surgeon, who
informed me my appendix had burst. When he removed my appendix, he also noted it
was gangrenous and necrotic. After asking him about how long it would take for my
appendix to become gangrenous and necrotic he informed me that an appendix usually
starts causing problems before it gets to the point where it bursts.
While in the hospital I developed an infection and had to have an additional surgery.
After the surgery I had to be fed through a tube painfully threaded through my nose to my
stomach so I could get nutrients as I couldn’t eat solid food.
Finally, a week after my surgery, I was able to leave the hospital. I spent a week at home
recovering before being able to return to work part-time. Since then I have received
medical attention twice for peptic ulcers, which are a side effect of my surgery and
infection. Doctors have told me I will suffer from these ulcers for the rest of my life.
I work as a policy researcher for the government and earn $65,000 a year before taxes.
At the time I became sick I had only been employed with the government for about three
months. Fortunately at the time I became ill I had full insurance coverage, which
defrayed some of the costs of my medical expenses, but I still had to pay around $10,000
of my own money; I was not reimbursed for those expenses. From the time I began
having symptoms to the time I returned to work part-time, I missed about two-and-a-half
weeks of work, which I had to take as unpaid leave. I worked part-time for two weeks
before returning to work full-time. Although I have recovered physically from my
appendicitis, when my peptic ulcers flare up I am in extreme pain and usually have to
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take two days off of work. It’s impossible to predict how often I will have these flare
ups, although doctors say it’s not uncommon to expect about 2-3 a year, which will result
in 4-6 sick days a year. If I take too many sick days, some of them have to count as
unpaid leave.
Statement of Dr. Johnson:
I have been a family physician with my own practice for 20 years. I have established a
steady clientele, and patients I saw as children are now returning to me with children of
their own. [Although I have an established patient list, I am always willing to accept
new patients.] [George Thompson has been a patient of mine for about five years,
during which time I have seen him in the office on eight separate occasions for
minor health issues, such as colds and allergies.]
George Thompson came to see me [as a new patient] in November 2009 [prior to
which I had never met him, personally or professionally], complaining of abdominal
cramps and stomach pains. He informed me he was nauseous, feverish, and somewhat
dehydrated. After examining him I determined he had stomach flu and sent him home
with instructions that he rest, eat plain food, and stay hydrated. He came to see me a few
days later with the same symptoms, and I offered the same diagnosis and remedies. I did
not hear from George Thompson again until after his surgery and stay in the hospital. I
learned of his appendicitis and ensuing medical problems. I was surprised to hear of his
appendicitis, as his abdomen had not been tender in the location typically associated with
appendicitis.
Traditionally, appendicitis is somewhat difficult to diagnose. Symptoms can closely
mirror those of the stomach flu; abdominal discomfort, nausea, and vomiting are
symptoms common to both ailments. When I examined Mr. Thompson, there was a
general abdominal tenderness, but nothing to suggest an inflamed appendix. As Mr.
Thompson’s symptoms were relatively minor, appendicitis seemed an unlikely diagnosis.
When Mr. Thompson returned with the same symptoms a short time later, I conducted
more thorough tests, including a white blood cell count and urinalysis. Although his
white blood cell count was somewhat elevated, I attributed this to his flu. His urinalysis
returned normal. The only other test option for appendicitis was a CT scan. Given the
lack of strong evidence that Mr. Thompson had appendicitis, I never considered ordering
a CT scan as it is costly and poses some risk to patients.
As I did not treat him during or after his appendicitis surgery and his hospitalization I can
offer no statement as to his experiences after our last appointment.
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Appendix B: Participant Instructions
Participant Instructions
After hearing testimony and sitting through a trial, a jury found Dr. Johnson had
committed medical malpractice when he failed to diagnose the plaintiff’s appendicitis in
a timely manner. It is now your job to determine the appropriate compensation for
George Thompson. Before you do that, however, Dr. Johnson has prepared a brief
statement.
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Appendix C: Defendant’s Statement (Apology)
Dr. Johnson’s Statement
[to camera]
Thank you for allowing me to make this statement.
[no pause between sentences] [look away]
I would first like to say that I am truly sorry for what has happened to George Thompson.
As a result of my failure to correctly diagnose his appendicitis, he has faced serious and
ongoing medical complications. The pain and inconvenience arising from his illness are
not lost on me; I feel deeply for him and extend my sympathy. [to camera] I take my
duty as a physician very seriously and I strive to give each patient the best possible care.
[to camera]
I have been a family physician for twenty years. During this time I have seen countless
patients and any number of ailments. I became a doctor because I love medicine, love
interacting with people, and truly want to help if I can. This profession has been good to
me and it pains me when I cannot help those seeking my help. Sometimes this inability
to help comes from my own limited resources at my clinic; sometimes medicine simply
isn’t able to solve all problems. [look away] Despite these limitations, however, I strive
to give the best possible care to all of my patients. It doesn’t matter to me what the
patient’s complaint is or if I have known him for more than a minute; I want, and have an
obligation, to help whomever I can and to do so to the best of my ability.
[to camera]
As I have said in my previous statement, when he came to see me, George Thompson’s
symptoms were consistent with the stomach flu. [look away] Rather than subject him to
a number of, in my opinion, needless tests, I sent him home with instructions to stay
rested and hydrated. When he came back to see me a few days later, I did run some
diagnostic tests, the results of which were inconclusive. [to camera] It is impossible for
me to say how I would have continued treating George if he had returned another time, as
each patient and course of treatment is unique.
I know the jury has found me liable for misdiagnosing George’s appendicitis. [look
away] I can only explain, as I did at trial, that appendicitis can be a difficult diagnosis to
make, even for a veteran physician. That being said, I would, once again, like to offer my
most profound apology to George for all of his pain and suffering.
[to camera]
Thank you.
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Appendix D: Defendant’s Statement (Excuse)
Dr. Johnson’s Statement
[to camera]
Thank you for allowing me to make this statement.
[look away]
I take my duty as a physician very seriously and I strive to give each patient the best
possible care.
[to camera] [no pause between sentences]
I have been a family physician for twenty years. During this time I have seen countless
patients and any number of ailments. I became a doctor because I love medicine,
interacting with people, and truly want to help if I can. This profession has been good to
me and it pains me when I cannot help those seeking my help. Sometimes this inability
to help comes from my own limited resources at my clinic; sometimes medicine simply
isn’t able to solve all problems. [look away] Despite these limitations, however, I strive
to give the best possible care to all of my patients. It doesn’t matter to me what the
patient’s complaint is or if I have known him for more than a minute; I want, and have an
obligation, to help whomever I can and to do so to the best of my ability.
[to camera]
As I have said in my previous statement, when he came to see me, George Thompson’s
symptoms were consistent with the stomach flu. [look away] Rather than subject him to
a number of, in my opinion, needless tests, I sent him home with instructions to stay
rested and hydrated. When he came back to see me a few days later, I did run some
diagnostic tests, the results of which were inconclusive. [to camera] It is impossible for
me to say how I would have continued treating George if he had returned another time, as
each patient and course of treatment is unique.
I know the jury has found me liable for misdiagnosing George’s appendicitis. [look
away] I can only offer, as I did at trial, that appendicitis can be a difficult diagnosis to
make, even for a veteran physician.
[to camera]
Thank you.
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Appendix E: Compensatory Damages
You have read the facts of the case, including statements from the defendant. It is
now your job to determine how much (if any) damages to award the plaintiff in
compensatory damages. Compensatory damages exist to compensate the plaintiff
for the loss he has suffered.
If, under the court's instructions, you find that the plaintiff [George Thompson] is
entitled to a verdict against defendant [Dr. Johnson], you must then award George
Thompson damages (economic and non-economic) in an amount that will reasonably
compensate for each of the following elements of claimed injury, damage, loss, or harm.
The term economic damages means objectively verifiable monetary losses including
medical expenses and loss of earnings.
The term non-economic damages means subjective, non-monetary losses including,
but not limited to: pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, and emotional
distress.
The amount of such award including economic and non-economic damages shall
include:

$
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Appendix F: Questionnaire
Please read the following questions and choose the number which most closely
corresponds with your answer.
1. Based on the facts of the case, how responsible do you believe Dr. Johnson is
misdiagnosing George Thompson’s appendicitis?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Completely
Responsible
Responsible

2. Based on the facts of the case, how severe would you rate the overall physical injury
to George Thompson?
1
2
3
4
5
Extremely
Not at All
Severe
Severe
3. How sincere do you believe Dr. Johnson was when he made his statement?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Completely
Sincere
Sincere
3a. In your opinion, what made Dr. Johnson’s statement seem sincere or insincere?

4. How believable was the statement offered by Dr. Johnson?
1
2
3
4
Not at All
Believable

5
Completely
Believable

4a. In your opinion, what made Dr. Johnson’s statement (not) believable?

5. In your opinion, how satisfactory were Dr. Johnson’s statements in explaining the
circumstances of the misdiagnosis?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Completely
Satisfactory
Satisfactory
6. In your opinion, how adequately did Dr. Johnson’s statement address the situation at
hand?
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1
Not at All

2

3

4

5
Completely

7. In your opinion, how likely is it that Dr. Johnson will engage in similar behavior in the
future?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Extremely
Likely
Likely
8. How close would you rate the relationship between Dr. Johnson and George
Thompson?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Very
Close
Close
9. How justified was George Thompson in bringing suit against Dr. Johnson?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Very
Justified
Justified
10. In your opinion, how guilty did Dr. Johnson feel for misdiagnosing George
Thompson?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Extremely
Guilty
Guilty
11. In your opinion, how ashamed was Dr. Johnson that he misdiagnosed George
Thompson?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Extremely
Ashamed
Ashamed
12. In your opinion, how compassionate is Dr. Johnson?
1
2
3
4
Not at All
Compassionate

5
Extremely
Compassionate

13. In your opinion, how difficult was it for Dr. Johnson to make his statement?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Extremely
Difficult
Difficult

14. To what extent do you empathize (identify) with Dr. Johnson?
1
2
3
4

5
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Not at All

Completely

15. To what extent do you empathize (identify) with George Thompson?
1
2
3
4
5
Not at All
Extremely

16. Do you agree with the jury’s verdict that Dr. Johnson is liable?
Yes

No

17. Had George Thompson ever visited Dr. Johnson before the visit which resulted in the
lawsuit?
Yes

No

18. Did Dr. Johnson say “I’m sorry” at any point when he was making his statement?
Yes

No

19. Regardless whether Dr. Johnson used the word ‘sorry,’ did his statement make you
think that Dr. Johnson was sincerely sorry?
Yes

No

20. What do you think was Dr. Johnson’s primary motivation for offering his statement?
He was truly
He was trying
His attorney
Other (please
sorry.
to present
told him to
explain):
himself in the
make the
best possible
statement.
light.

120
Appendix G: Interpersonal Trust Scale5
Indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement by using the
following scale:
1 = Strongly Agree
2 = Mildly Agree
3= Agree and Disagree Equally (or neither agree nor disagree)
4 = Mildly Disagree
5 = Strongly Disagree
Hypocrisy is on the increase in our society.
In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until the strangers have provided
evidence that they are trustworthy.
This country has a dark future unless we can attract better people into politics.
Fear of social disgrace or punishment rather than conscience prevents most people from
breaking the law.
Using the honor system of not have a teacher present during exams would probably result
in increased cheating.
Parents usually can be relied on to keep their promises.
The United Nations will never be an effective force in keeping world peace.
The judiciary is a place where we can all get unbiased treatment.
Most people would be horrified if they knew how much news that the public hears and
sees is distorted.
It is safe to believe that, in spite of what people say, most people are primarily interested
in their own welfare.
Even though we have reports in newspapers, radio, and T.V., it is hard to get objective
accounts of public events.
The future seems very promising.
If we really knew what was going on in international politics, the public would have
reason to be more frightened than they now seem to be.
Most elected officials are really sincere in their campaign promises.
5

Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967, 1971)
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Many major national sports contests are fixed in one way or another.
Most experts can be relied upon to tell the truth about the limits of their knowledge.
Most parents can be relied upon to carry out their threats of punishments.
Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do.
In these competitive times you have to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of
you.
Most idealists are sincere and usually practice what they preach.
Most salesmen are honest in describing their products.
Most students in school would not cheat even if they were sure of getting away with it.
Most repairmen will not overcharge even if they think you are ignorant of their specialty.
A large share of accident claims filed against insurance companies are phony.
Most people answer public opinion polls honestly.
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Appendix H: Faith in People Scale6
Select the option which most closely fits with your answer of the question.
1. Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can’t be too careful
in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?
Most people can be trusted.

You can’t be too careful.

2. Would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to
look out for themselves?
To help others.

To look out for themselves.

3. If you don’t watch yourself, people will take advantage of you.
Agree

Disagree

4. No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it.
Agree

Disagree

5. Human nature is fundamentally cooperative.
Agree
Disagree

6

Faith in People Scale (Rosenberg, 1957)
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Appendix I: International Personality Item Pool
Please read each statement carefully and then use the scale below to rate how
accurately each statement describes you. Rate yourself as you generally are now,
not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in
relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same
age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be
kept in absolute confidence.
1 = Very Inaccurate
2 = Moderately Inaccurate
3 = Neither Inaccurate or Accurate (or equally accurate and inaccurate)
4 = Moderately Accurate
5 = Very Accurate
I trust others.
I believe that others have good intentions.
I trust what people say.
I believe that people are basically moral.
I believe in human goodness.
I distrust people.
I suspect hidden motives in others.
I believe most people try to be fair.
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Appendix J: Demographic Information
Age:
Gender: Male
Female
Year in School: Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Other
Religious Affiliation:
Christian (Non-Denominational)
Catholic
Protestant
Lutheran
Methodist
Presbyterian
Baptist
Other Protestant
Mormon
Jewish
Muslim
Other (Please Specify)
How strongly do you identify with your religion?
Major:
Do you have a regular physician?
Do you have health insurance?
Have you ever been involved in medical malpractice litigation?
How many times a year do you see a physician?
Is Dr. Johnson liable for George Thompson’s injuries?
Please indicate the level of your parents’ educations on the scale immediately below.
Mother

Father
some high school/vocational
school
high school/vocational
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school graduate/GED
some college/associate’s
degree
college graduate (bachelor’s
degree)
some graduate/professional
school
graduate/professional degree

